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Nova Southeastern University 
ABSTRACT 
The social information-processing (I-P) model states that cognition assumes several 
cognitive steps (encoding, interpretation, response access, and selection). It has been 
shown that anxious youth display deficits or distortions at various stages of the social I-P 
model. In response to ambiguous situations, they show threat perception and 
interpretation biases, choose maladaptive responses, and engage in greater levels of 
avoidance than do non-anxious youth. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is an 
empirically-supported treatment for anxious youth. It aims to increase mindfulness, 
acceptance, and cognitive defusion, and to decrease experiential avoidance. The 
mechanisms explaining the effectiveness of ACT processes suggest that they counteract 
automatic biased responses (which are characteristic of anxious children) during I-P 
stages. Specifically, research shows a strong association between mindfulness and 
attention, and between attention and decision-making. Therefore, it is likely that 
decreased mindfulness during the initial stages of I-P (i.e., during the encoding and 
interpretation phases) would predict ineffective solutions and explain associations 
between ineffective solutions and anxiety. The goal of this study was to examine ACT 




mindfulness, cognitive fusion/defusion, acceptance, and avoidance play during 
adolescents’ cognitive experiences in hypothetical situations. Self-report data of ACT 
variables, I-P variables, and anxiety were collected from 288 middle-school students of 
primarily Latinx backgrounds (87%). Findings indicated that across situations, 
mindfulness played a significant role in associations between youths’ I-P and anxiety; 
however, when characteristics of specific situations were considered, mindfulness was 
negatively related to threat interpretation and to maladaptive responses only in social 
situations. The results from this study highlight the protective role of mindfulness for 
anxious adolescents who tend to automatically interpret ambiguous social situations as 
threatening. Future mindfulness intervention researchers should strongly consider 
including measures of social adjustment when studying Latinx early adolescents, and 
clinicians should consider implementing mindfulness strategies with adolescents who 
struggle socially.  









Statement of the Problem 
 Adolescence is a critical phase for the development of mental disorders, 
particularly internalizing disorders. This is largely because adolescents are prone to being 
emotionally reactive, impulsive, and susceptible to peer influence (Lee et al., 2014; 
Polanczyk, Salum, Sugaya, Caye, & Rohde, 2015). Notably, during adolescence, the 
brain is still developing and is highly plastic (Lee et al., 2014). Therefore, adolescence 
invites neural malleability that is largely guided by experiences, and those experiences 
develop ingrained cognitive patterns (Crick & Dodge, 1994).  
 Emerging research suggests that adolescents from minority cultural backgrounds 
are at increased risk for anxiety. Specifically, Latinx youth generally display more 
anxiety symptoms than do children from other cultural backgrounds (Martinez, Polo, & 
Carter, 2012; Varela et al., 2004). This may be due in part to Latinx youth’s exposure to a 
variety of cultural stressors including acculturative stress (i.e., the tension experienced 
when adjusting to a new culture; Suarez-Morales, Dillon, & Szapocznik, 2007). Because 
Latinx youth comprise a substantial portion of youth in the U.S. (18.3%; Census Bureau, 
2018) and because these individuals are at increased risk for anxiety, there is a significant 
need for clinical research that focuses on anxiety in Latinx adolescents in the U.S.  
In order to improve interventions for Latinx adolescents, the first necessary step is 
to develop a better understanding of their social cognitive processing and how their 
cognitions lead to specific behavioral responses. Studying social information-processing 
is particularly relevant to adolescents, for whom social interactions play a major role in 





between youths’ cognitions and behaviors, theorists have proposed the social 
information-processing (I-P) model (Dodge, 1986; Crick & Dodge, 1994). The social 
information-processing (I-P) model is a cognitive model that has been applied to anxious 
youth (Beck & Clark, 1997). It assumes that social information is processed through a 
series of cognitive stages before a behavioral response is produced. To date, there are 
only a few studies focusing on the social I-P of Latinx youth. However, the available 
research shows that Latinx children and adolescents who display high levels of worry 
tend to show threat interpretation biases during the interpretation phase and to choose 
ineffective solutions during the response selection phase (Suarez-Morales & Bell, 2006). 
These findings suggest that there is a need for research that identifies appropriate coping 
strategies for Latinx youth who display social information-processing deficits and high 
anxiety-levels. 
Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) is a third wave cognitive therapy, 
which signifies that it focuses on the function rather than the content of thoughts and 
behaviors. ACT includes several therapeutic strategies including mindfulness 
(nonjudgmentally paying attention to the present moment), acceptance (awareness and 
embrace of thoughts and feelings), and cognitive defusion (the ability to see thoughts as 
verbal processes instead of truths) and aims to reduce experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion (entanglement with thoughts). These strategies have been shown to 
alleviate psychopathological symptoms in youth, particularly youth with anxiety 






It is likely that mindfulness, acceptance, cognitive fusion/defusion, and avoidance 
are related to several of the social information-processing stages in Latinx anxious youth. 
For example, anxious adolescents’ threat perception and interpretation biases during the 
encoding and interpretation phases of the social I-P model (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997) 
may be counteracted by mindfulness. Although ACT has been shown to benefit anxious 
youth, no study has examined ACT processes in relation to anxious youths’ social I-P. An 
examination of the association between ACT processes and social I-P theory would 
distinguish the therapeutic strategies that are effective during specific stages of 
adolescents’ social I-P. The purpose of this study will be to examine ACT in the context 
of social I-P theory using novel measurement strategies in a high-risk sample of primarily 









Review of the Literature 
 
Anxiety: Definition and Epidemiology 
 There are various forms of anxiety with corresponding clinical diagnoses. 
However, anxiety is generally characterized by “anticipation of future threat,” and it is 
typically associated with avoidant responses (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 
189). Anxiety disorders are distinguished from one another by the specific “objects or 
situations that induce fear, anxiety, or avoidance” and by associated thoughts (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 189). For example, separation anxiety disorder is 
characterized by excessive fear of “separation from home or attachment figures,” social 
anxiety disorder is marked by intense fear of “social situations in which the individual 
may be scrutinized by others,” and generalized anxiety disorder presents as “excessive 
anxiety and worry” about various topics (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pp. 
191, 202, and 222). Anxiety that is disproportionate to the severity of the situation or that 
transcends what is considered age-appropriate is diagnosable.  
 Anxiety disorders are the most prevalent form of psychopathology in youth, 
suggesting that they begin manifesting themselves at an early age (Beesdo, Knappe, & 
Pine, 2009). A recent survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC, 2019) shows that 7% of youth had a diagnosable anxiety disorder in 
2016-2017. Additionally, having ever been diagnosed with an internalizing disorder in 






 Various epidemiological factors including age, gender, and ethnicity, contribute to 
differences in anxiety. Research shows that anxiety manifests differently throughout 
development (Beesdo et al., 2009). Different developmental periods call for varying 
stressors; therefore, the type of anxiety disorder that is likely to manifest depends on age. 
For example, separation anxiety disorder is likely to begin in childhood because of this 
time-period’s emphasis on the parent-child relationship. However, social anxiety disorder 
is more likely to begin and peak in early adolescence due to this period’s emphasis on 
peer relationships. Beyond this time, in later adolescence, generalized anxiety disorder 
and panic disorder are more prevalent, as adolescents begin to focus on increased 
responsibilities that come in early adulthood (Beesdo et al., 2009).  
 Early adolescents are at a particularly vulnerable time, both socially and 
academically, as they adjust following the transition from elementary school to middle 
school and prepare to transition into high school. Because academics and social issues are 
at the forefront of adolescents’ triggers of anxiety (Horowitz & Graf, 2019), middle 
school is prime time for the development or exacerbation of anxiety symptoms. Various 
studies have shown that middle school is a “trigger for the emergence of 
psychopathology and maladjustment” (McLaughlin, Hilt, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007, p. 
802). For example, the onset of social phobia, panic disorder, and generalized anxiety 
disorder typically occurs in early adolescence (see McLaughlin et al., 2007, for a review).  
Gender differences in the prevalence of anxiety disorders have also been found. 
According to the American Psychiatric Association (2013), females are twice as likely as 
males to have an anxiety disorder. This makes sense, considering that girls are more 





good,” and worry about getting accepted into the college of their choice (Horowitz & 
Graf, 2019).  
 Prevalence rates of anxiety also differ by ethnicity. Latinx adolescents generally 
report higher anxiety symptoms than other ethnic groups. Varela and colleagues (2009) 
showed that Mexican and Latin American children report higher anxiety levels than 
European American children. Other researchers have shown that Latinx adolescents are 
more likely to display clinically significant levels of social anxiety and separation anxiety 
than Caucasian and African American adolescents (Ohannessian, McCauley, & 
Cheeseman, 2017).  
 Studies focusing on anxiety in Latinx adolescents have shown that anxiety and 
age are negatively correlated such that younger adolescents (typically in middle school) 
show peak anxiety-levels. For example, Glover, Pumariega, Holzer, Wise, and Rodriguez 
(1999) found that age was negatively associated with anxiety such that Latin American 
seventh graders (aged 11-12) exhibited the highest levels of anxiety. Similarly, Ingles, La 
Greca, Marzo, Garcia-Lopez, & Garcia-Fernandez (2010) studied social anxiety rates in 
1570 Spanish adolescents aged 14-17, and they found that girls and younger adolescents 
reported higher social anxiety than boys and older adolescents.   
 Further, La Greca, Ingles, Lai, and Marzo (2015) studied social anxiety symptoms 
in 1,191 Hispanic adolescents (70% of whom indicated that Spanish was their first 
language). La Greca et al. (2015) also found that social anxiety symptoms decreased with 
age in their Hispanic sample. They attributed this finding to the fact that younger 
adolescents experience a more difficult transition (from middle school to high school), 





particularly difficult for Latin American youth as school drop-out rates tend to be 
significantly higher in this population than in other cultural groups (Wheelock & Miao, 
2005; as cited in La Greca et al., 2015). The consistent finding that early 
adolescents/middle school students display higher anxiety-levels than later adolescents 
highlights the importance of studying anxiety in this age-group.  
 Beyond this, strong associations between social processes and anxiety in middle 
school calls for research that focuses on these factors in Latinx youth. For example, 
Motoca, Williams, and Silverman (2012) studied associations between anxiety, peer 
interactions, and social skills in a primarily Latinx sample of 297 children and 
adolescents. They found that anxiety was positively associated with negative peer 
interactions and that social skills mediated the association between anxiety and negative 
peer interactions. Therefore, peer interactions are likely to play a significant role in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety symptoms in Latinx youth. Overall, findings 
highlight the connection between social influences and anxiety for Latinx early 
adolescents and suggest that zoning in on these factors in clinical research would be a 
worthy endeavor. 
Social Information-Processing Theory 
The social information-processing model was developed in response to research 
showing low correlations between cognition and behavior (Dodge, 1986). In an attempt 
to clarify these findings, Dodge (1986) challenged the assumption that cognition 
constitutes a single factor. He argued that cognition assumes several factors or cognitive 
steps. Additionally, he emphasized situation-specificity and referred to Mischel’s (1968) 





ways in all situations” (p. 80). Therefore, Dodge (1986) aimed to elucidate how social 
cognitions lead to specific social behaviors (that may vary across situations) in order to 
predict children’s adjustment outcomes. 
Dodge (1986) theorized that children’s social information-processing follows four 
cognitive steps (encoding, interpretation, response access, and selection) followed by a 
behavioral response (enactment). During the encoding phase, children are presented with 
a stimulus or situation and they “focus on and encode particular cues in the situation” 
(Crick & Dodge, 1994, p. 74). Once the situation is encoded, children develop an 
inference about the situation. For example, if an aggressive child encodes that a ball hit 
him, he might then interpret the situation as a classmate initiating a fight. After 
interpreting the situation, children retrieve several possible solutions from long-term 
memory (response access) and choose one solution (selection). The solution is then 
behaviorally manifested through the enactment phase. 
Dodge’s (1986) original social information-processing theory was revisited and 
revised in later research (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Crick and Dodge’s (1994) model is 
similar to Dodge’s (1986) original model, but it includes an additional step (goal 
development) before the response access phase and it does not assume the linear nature 
that Dodge’s (1986) model assumes. Moreover, Crick and Dodge (1994) break down 
each step into several sub-processes. For example, they explain that during the 
interpretation phase, children (a) use a filtered lens that is largely influenced by their past 
experiences, (b) review past goals and how effective those goals were, (c) infer others’ 
intentions, (d) evaluate their self-efficacy in terms of their ability to successfully enact 





experience (Crick & Dodge, 1994, p. 76). Crick and Dodge (1994) also emphasize how 
emotions contribute to each social cognitive process. For example, in addition to the 
encoding of environmental cues, it is also likely that children inadvertently encode 
emotional cues. Moreover, goals and behaviors can be influenced by emotions. For 
example, feelings of anger are likely to lead to aggressive goals and responses. Therefore, 
Crick and Dodge (1994) explain that Dodge’s (1986) original model was oversimplified 
and that it inaccurately inferred causality. They emphasize that the revised model 
accounts for those limitations by showing that social cognitions are not necessarily linear 
and that they are both complex and intertwined with emotions. 
Importantly, both models emphasize the relevance of situational specificity. Crick 
and Dodge (1994) explain that the structure of social information-processing differs 
between familiar and novel situations. That is, children’s processing in familiar 
circumstances is automatic whereas novel situations invite more conscious or reflective 
processing. Rabiner, Lenhart, and Lochman (1990) applied this difference to rejected 
non-aggressive boys when they showed that these boys “process information adequately 
under reflective circumstances but inadequately under automatic conditions” (as cited in 
Crick & Dodge, 1994, p. 79). Therefore, Rabiner and colleagues (1990) suggested that 
maladjusted children have poorer processing capabilities when the situation is familiar 
and pulls for an automatic response (as cited in Crick & Dodge, 1994). This is likely 
because maladjusted (e.g., aggressive or anxious) children may rely on past maladaptive 
behavioral responses (Beck & Clark, 1997). Crick and Dodge (1994) compare children’s 
learned responses to a marble rolling down a muddy and drying hill. At first, the marble 





formed paths and cause them to become more deeply entrenched. Crick and Dodge 
(1994) explain that “with repeated trials, the path will become smoother and deeper, and 
the marble will roll more rapidly” (p. 81). Therefore, past social cognitive processes and 
behavioral responses become increasingly automatic, regardless of how effective they 
might be. 
Measurement of social information-processing. Social information processes 
are likely to appear abstract without appropriate forms of measurement. Crick and Dodge 
(1994) state that the most common way to capture the social information-processing 
model is by presenting children with hypothetical situations. With this method, children 
are presented with vignettes of hypothetical situations and are asked about various steps 
of processing. Research that has included these open-ended measures has shown that 
when compared to controls, maladjusted children deviate from typical cognitive and 
behavioral responses. Crick and Dodge (1994) propose three explanations for these 
deviations: (a) memory deficits interfere with maladjusted children’s ability to accurately 
recall information, (b) selective attention causes maladjusted children to disregard other 
telling cues in their social environment, and (c) automatic processing and responding 
predominates, even when the situation may be somewhat novel (“because they believe 
they already have the situation ‘figured out’”) (p. 83). Therefore, children and 
adolescents suffering from psychopathological symptoms will probably jump to 
conclusions and selectively attend to specific cues in their environments instead of 
absorbing the whole context. 
 I-P theory and anxiety in youth. The components of social information-





that children and adolescents with anxiety have deficits at various stages of the 
information-processing model (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). For example, it has been 
shown that anxious children selectively attend to threatening cues during the encoding 
phase (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & Brown, 1995). In their 
application of the information-processing model to anxious individuals, Beck and Clark 
(1997) explain that although the encoding phase (or the orienting mode) is typically 
processed relatively quickly, people who are anxious have an orienting mode that is 
“excessively tuned to detect negative stimuli” (p. 52). This suggests that anxious children 
are primed to detect threat.  
It is also likely that anxious children’s attentional intensity is impaired (Daleiden 
& Vasey, 1997). Therefore, anxious youth use less information from their environments 
to make decisions. This supports the notion that encoding in anxious individuals is 
automatic. Beck and Clark (1997) describe automaticity as “effortless,” “involuntary,” 
“relatively fast,” and “stereotypic,” and say that it involves “minimal analysis” (p. 50). 
They argue that “the goal in the treatment of anxiety is to deactivate the more automatic 
primal threat mode and to strengthen more constructive reflective modes of thinking” (p. 
49). Relatedly, distractibility tends to be higher in anxious children (Daleiden & Vasey, 
1997) and might be another factor contributing to their automatic responses. Given these 
automatic and reflexive cognitive processes, it is likely that anxious children would 
benefit from interventions that specifically target the encoding phase. 
Children with anxiety also show deficits or distortions during the interpretation 
phase (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). For example, Chorpita, Albano, and Barlow (1996) 





presented with ambiguous situations were more likely to interpret them as threatening. 
Similarly, Suarez-Morales and Bell-Dolan (2001) studied worry (the cognitive 
component of anxiety) and cognitive processes in 277 children in grades 5 and 6. They 
assessed cognitive processing with the Children’s Opinions of Everyday Life Events 
(COELE), which is an open-ended vignette-based questionnaire. The COELE (which has 
been revised; COELE-R, Suarez-Morales & Bell, 2006) resembles other commonly used 
measures of social cognitive processing (Crick & Dodge, 1994) and it captures the 
interpretation, response access, and selection phases of Dodge’s (1986) I-P model. 
Suarez-Morales and Bell-Dolan (2001) presented children with clearly threatening 
situations and with ambiguous situations. They found that unlike non-worriers, children 
with high levels of worry found both ambiguous and unambiguous situations to be 
threatening. Moreover, worriers were more likely to believe that the event was likely to 
occur to them. Relatedly, Muris, Meesters, Smulders, and Mayer (2005) studied 
associations between various psychopathological symptoms and threat perception in 
typically developing children, aged 8 to 12. They found that anxiety uniquely contributed 
to threat perception above and beyond the effects of depression and aggression. This 
highlights the robust association between anxiety and threat perception.  
Muris, Merckelbach, and Damsma (2000) also presented children with vignettes; 
however, their goal was to determine how quickly it takes for anxious children to judge a 
story as threatening. Muris et al. (2000) presented 252 children aged 8 to 13 with 
ambiguous stories of social situations and asked them to indicate when they found the 
story to be scary. Their results showed that socially anxious children judged ambiguous 





likely to jump to conclusions and automatically perceive a situation (regardless of 
whether it is actually threatening) as threatening. 
Concerning the response access and selection phases, research suggests that 
although anxious children produce a similar number of solutions during the response 
access phase as do non-anxious children, the solutions that they choose tend to be 
ineffective. For example, Suarez-Morales and Bell (2006) found that in fifth graders, 
worry was related to ineffective solution-choices; however, response access did not differ 
between worriers and non-worriers. Daleiden and Vasey (1997) clarified that the coping 
strategies most commonly displayed by anxious children during the selection phase are 
avoidance and distraction. Therefore, although children who are anxious are able to 
produce several solutions to a problem, the solutions that they choose are likely to 
reinforce their anxiety in the long term. 
I-P and Latinxs. Past research points to the significance of social experiences to 
adolescents, especially to Latinx adolescents (McLaughlin et al., 2007), and to the 
impressionability of the developing adolescent brain (Lee et al., 2014). Therefore, the 
study of Latinx adolescents’ social cognitive processes merits more attention than it is 
currently receiving. Based on the few studies focusing on Latinx youths’ social 
information-processing, Latinx children and adolescents who display high levels of worry 
tend to show threat interpretation biases during the interpretation phase and to choose 
ineffective solutions during the response selection phase (Suarez-Morales & Bell, 2006).  
 Further, in an extension of Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, and Ryan (1996), which was an 
I-P study with a largely Caucasian sample, Varela et al. (2004) studied the transmission 





presented European American, Mexican American, and Mexican parents and children 
with ambiguous situations (e.g., On the way to school, you begin to feel funny in your 
stomach) and the families were instructed to discuss each situation. Varela et al. (2004) 
found that Mexican and Mexican American parents gave more somatic non-anxious 
interpretations of ambiguous situations than did European American parents. Moreover, it 
was found that Mexican and Mexican American children reported higher levels of worry 
than did European American children. Therefore, Latinx parents tended to attribute the 
symptoms in ambiguous situations to somatization and their children were more anxious. 
Notably, Varela et al. (2004) also found that children’s assimilation was negatively 
associated with worry symptoms. Altogether, these findings point to the significance of 
culture in the study of children’s I-P.  
Relational Frame Theory and ACT Processes 
Acceptance and commitment therapy was developed through the lens of relational 
frame theory (RFT). RFT resulted from a philosophical worldview called functional 
contextualism, which assumes that psychological events involve the “interactions of 
whole organisms in and with a context” (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2012, p. 32). 
Functional contextualism emphasizes that “context includes both history and situations as 
they relate to behavior” and that “it is not possible to have a response without stimulation 
or stimulation without a response” (Hayes et al., 2012, p. 33). Therefore, there is a focus 
on “the whole event,” where individuals “act in context.” The notion that behavior does 
not exist in a vacuum is highlighted by this worldview. Because context is so important, 
functional contextualists deny that there are “truths” and assert that instead, knowledge is 





the same building, functional contextualists would argue that both images could be “true” 
representations of the building, depending on the context (Hayes et al., 2012). In a 
situation where a painting might be useful, that image is the “true” image, and in a 
situation where a blueprint would be more practical, the blueprint is the “true” image. 
This suggests that there are no universal truths and it introduces flexibility to cognition. 
Blackledge (2003) explains the components of RFT through Lang’s (1985) fear 
network. According to Lang, the contents of the fear network, which include stimulus 
propositions (e.g., fear), response propositions (e.g., running away), and meaning 
propositions (e.g., dangerous), are all interconnected and are stored in long-term memory.  
For example, if someone is in a wooded area this could be enough to lead to fear and 
running away because of the meaning that is indirectly linked to the wooded area 
(danger). According to Blackledge (2003), “components of the network can be learned 
through direct experience … through instruction … and through modeling” (p. 422). 
Blackledge (2003) applies Lang’s model to RFT by emphasizing that the components 
relate in specific ways to one another. For example, ‘fear’ can be considered a cause of 
‘running away’ (a causal relationship), but ‘snake’ equals ‘danger’ (a coordinated 
relationship). Moreover, ‘snake’ is included in a wooded area, so this is a hierarchical 
relationship. 
Blackledge (2003) explains that although the ability to relate information in this 
way can be helpful, it can also be detrimental when this process gets “out of control” (p. 
425). This can happen through excessive derived relational responding, when stimuli are 
consistently mentally related even though there has been no environmental reinforcer to 





(and danger is coordinately related to fear), that person can become afraid as a result of 
the indirect association between snake and fear. Therefore, although this individual has 
never been taught to be afraid of snakes, he or she may develop a phobia as a result of 
derived relational responding. Moreover, hierarchical relationships can change the 
function of stimuli. For example, if a child who once enjoyed playing in the woods was 
told that the woods contained snakes and that child already has a fear of snakes, this is 
likely to result in a transformation of the wooded area’s functions (Blackledge, 2003, p. 
427). Whereas the woods may have been viewed as fun and harmless before the 
introduction of the snake stimulus, they are now viewed as dangerous.  
All of these relationships highlight the power of language and how “words come 
to share the functions of a wide variety of experiences and events” (Blackledge, 2003, p. 
427). Specific ACT strategies target the literality of thoughts. Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda, and Lillis (2006) propose that psychopathology occurs when the meaning 
attributed to thoughts stunts psychological growth. He refers to this as psychological 
inflexibility and the goal of ACT is to increase psychological flexibility. In line with this, 
research has shown that psychological flexibility predicts a lower likelihood of having a 
disorder. Psychological flexibility can be achieved by increasing cognitive defusion, 
mindfulness, and acceptance, and by decreasing experiential avoidance (see Hayes et al., 
2006 for a review).  
 Cognitive fusion/defusion. Intervening with the literality attributed to language is 
done through specific ACT techniques including cognitive defusion. Cognitive fusion, 
which is the target of change for cognitive defusion, “refers to excessive or improper 





guided more by their inflexible verbal networks than by the contingencies of 
reinforcement in their environment” (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 6). The focus of cognitive 
defusion is on the context of thought rather than on the content of thought (how someone 
is thinking as opposed to what someone is thinking). Therefore, whereas cognitive fusion 
relates to enmeshment with thoughts and by equating thoughts to literal truths, cognitive 
defusion techniques aim to create distance between the client and his or her thoughts 
(Greco, Lambert, & Baer, 2008; Sole et al., 2015). This is done by changing clients’ 
relationship with their thoughts. With cognitive defusion, clients are taught to accept and 
live with their thoughts instead of trying to suppress or change them. Cognitive defusion 
strategies are driven by the notion that individuals are more likely to hold a thought 
lightly if they remove the meaning and personalization tied to unhelpful thoughts. 
Therefore, teaching clients to notice their thoughts for what they are -- just thoughts (e.g., 
“I’m noticing I’m having the thought that no one loves me,” instead of, “No one loves 
me”) – defuses them from their thoughts and reduces the struggle and distress associated 
with their thoughts.  
 A specific example of a cognitive defusion technique is the “leaves on a stream” 
exercise (Harris, 2009). During the leaves on a stream exercise, clients are asked to 
imagine leaves flowing down a stream and are asked to place each of their passing 
thoughts onto a leaf, allowing each leaf to pass naturally. This activity targets the 
acceptance and observation of thoughts. It creates distance between the client and the 
thought because the client is asked to visualize it on a leaf (which is separate from him- 
or herself). Therefore, the goal of cognitive defusion techniques is to change a fused 





 Mindfulness and acceptance. Mindfulness is another strategy included in ACT. 
Kabat-Zinn (1994) defines mindfulness as “paying attention in a particular way: on 
purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (as cited in Hayes & Greco, 2008, 
p. 4). Mindfulness stems from Eastern religious traditions and differs from Western 
ideologies in important ways. Follette, Palm, and Pearson (2006) note that in Buddhist 
traditions, mindfulness is used as a tool to cope with negative emotions, and this coping 
style is in contrast to typical Western strategies. They explain that whereas Western 
traditions emphasize controlling and eradicating negative emotions, Eastern traditions 
involve more of a passive acceptance of these private experiences.  
 Notably, mindfulness actually aligns with children’s inherent cognitive 
processing. The Buddhist concept of “beginner’s mind” reflects mindfulness through 
children’s ability to be open, to be receptive, and to be ready to learn (O’Brien & Murrell, 
2008, p. 17). Langer (2000) explains that mindfulness opposes mindlessness, which is 
characterized by automatic responding that is largely shaped by past experiences (Hayes 
& Greco, 2008). Therefore, mindfulness is likely to counteract excessive automaticity in 
cognitive processing. 
Importantly, mindfulness requires acceptance. Acceptance involves the awareness 
and embrace of thoughts and feelings (Hayes et al., 2006). Acceptance could be 
incorporated into treatment for anxiety by having anxious children sit with their anxiety 
and learn to accept it instead of struggling to eradicate it. This process has been described 
by Harris (2009) as turning off the “struggle switch” instead of constantly battling with 





 Experiential avoidance. Experiential avoidance, which is considered the 
opposite of acceptance, refers to individuals’ attempts to avoid internal and external 
experiences. Therefore, experiential avoidance may “refer to thought suppression, 
emotion avoidance, or distraction from unpleasant interoceptive or physiological cues, as 
well as avoidance of all contexts associated with these unwanted experiences” (Coyne, 
Cheron, & Ehrenreich, 2008, p. 38). ACT processes including mindfulness, acceptance, 
and cognitive defusion directly counteract avoidance. Therefore, all ACT processes are in 
the service of reducing the avoidance of private and public events. 
Measurement of ACT processes in youth. The measures developed to assess 
ACT processes include Likert-type self-report questionnaires. These questionnaires have 
been used in research and as measures of progress in therapy. Among the few available 
measures of ACT processes are the Avoidance and Fusion Questionnaire for Youth 
(AFQ-Y) and the Child Acceptance and Mindfulness Measure (CAMM) (Greco et al., 
2008; Greco, Baer, & Smith, 2011). The AFQ-Y is a 17-item measure of cognitive fusion 
(e.g., “The bad things I think about myself must be true”), avoidance (e.g., “I push away 
thoughts and feelings that I don’t like”), and behavioral ineffectiveness (e.g., “I do worse 
in school when I have thoughts that make me feel sad”) designed for children and 
adolescents. The CAMM compliments the AFQ-Y by focusing on acceptance and 
mindfulness. Children and adolescents rate 10 items that target internal experiences (e.g., 
“I pay close attention to my thoughts”), awareness (e.g., “I walk from class to class 
without noticing what I’m doing”), and acceptance (e.g., “I get upset with myself for 
having certain thoughts”) (Coyne et al., 2008, p. 48). Items are added to produce an 





associated with AFQ-Y scores, supporting the validity of these measures (Coyne et al., 
2008). 
It is important to note that there are currently no open-ended measures of ACT 
processes in youth. Although vignettes have been included as measures of information 
processing, they have not been studied in the context of mindfulness, acceptance, 
cognitive defusion, cognitive fusion, and avoidance in youth. Vignettes are informative in 
the assessment of youths’ coping repertoires because they are designed to resemble 
specific, realistic situations and because they require children to spontaneously describe 
their reactions. Therefore, research focusing on ACT processes through vignettes would 
be informative. 
 ACT processes and anxiety in youth. Various components addressed in ACT 
including mindfulness, cognitive defusion, and avoidance have been studied in samples 
of adults and children (e.g., Bergomi, Strohle, Michalak, Funke, & Berking, 2013; Tan & 
Martin, 2016). Although there is a growing body of ACT process research that 
specifically focuses on anxiety in youth, most of the available research includes adult 
samples. Moreover, the availability of studies with children and adolescents varies across 
ACT strategies. For example, it appears that the number of adult mindfulness studies 
largely outweighs the number of mindfulness studies in youth. A review of the literature 
suggests that most of the available research on mindfulness in youth consists of cross-
sectional trait-mindfulness research and of small-scale mindfulness-based therapy 
studies. Similarly, there is a general scarcity of research on cognitive defusion and the 
majority of the available literature is on adults (e.g., Arch, Wolitzky-Taylor, Eifert, & 





as an intervention strategy and as a mechanism of change stems from adult research. 
Conversely, there is an abundance of research on anxiety and avoidance in children and 
adolescents (e.g., Venta, Sharp, & Hart, 2012). Thus, the link between experiential 
avoidance and anxiety in youth has been heavily substantiated. Because distinct ACT 
components have been studied to different degrees in youth, comprehensive research that 
covers several ACT processes in anxious youth is warranted. 
 Anxiety and mindfulness/acceptance. It appears that most of the mindfulness 
research in youth consists of cross-sectional trait-mindfulness studies and of small-scale 
intervention studies. Overall, findings suggest that trait-levels of mindfulness are 
negatively correlated with anxiety and that mindfulness-based interventions produce 
decreases in anxiety. For example, Tan and Martin (2016) studied cross-sectional 
associations between mindfulness/acceptance (as measured by the CAMM) and 
adjustment outcomes in 106 adolescents. Specifically, they found that mindfulness was 
negatively associated with stress, anxiety, and depression. They also found positive 
associations between mindfulness and resiliency and between mindfulness and self-
esteem. Researchers have also shown that both trait-levels of mindfulness and 
mindfulness-based interventions are negatively correlated with anxiety-related automatic 
thoughts (Frewen, Evans, Maraj, Dozois, & Paridge, 2007). Furthermore, dispositional 
mindfulness is more strongly associated with improved quality of life and reductions in 
internalizing symptoms than is cognitive reappraisal (Chambers et al., 2014). These 






Indeed, mindfulness has been shown to moderate the association between daily 
stressors and adjustment outcomes. For example, Bergomi et al. (2013)found that 
mindfulness buffered the association between unavoidable distressing experiences and 
psychological well-being in teens and adults. They explain that mindfulness opposes 
avoidance and promotes a nonjudgmental acceptance of experiences. Therefore, 
remaining mindful in the face of unavoidable stressors is likely to reduce 
psychopathology symptoms.  
Moreover, Calvete, Orue, and Sampedro (2017) found that the acting with 
awareness subscale of dispositional mindfulness moderated the longitudinal association 
between stressors and psychological symptoms in 1257 adolescents. Similarly, Marks, 
Sobanski, and Hine (2010) studied protective and risk factors for anxiety in 317 
Australian high schoolers. Their results showed that dispositional mindfulness attenuated 
the association between daily hassles and anxiety. They contrasted this with dispositional 
rumination’s tendency to exacerbate the association between daily hassles and anxiety. 
Marks et al. (2010) explain that mindfulness and rumination are two opposing cognitive 
coping strategies. They state that rumination is a “tendency to focus repetitively on 
symptoms of distress and their possible causes and consequences” (p. 831) and contrast 
this with mindfulness, which is present-focused and nonjudgmental. Therefore, 
mindfulness (which counteracts rumination) appears to serve a protective factor in the 
face of stressors that produce anxiety in teens.  
 Clinical trials have also been conducted to pilot test the efficacy of mindfulness-
based interventions in youth. For example, Semple, Reid, and Miller (2005) conducted a 





overall, the intervention led to clinical improvements in anxiety. Similarly, Jennings and 
Jennings (2013) piloted a brief mindfulness intervention for adolescents. The intervention 
included four 50-minute sessions over the course of three weeks. Jennings and Jennings 
(2013) found that teens’ anxiety was reduced by 30%, and that this decrease was 
probably due to cognitive processes tied to mindfulness. Results from pre- and post-Beck 
Anxiety Inventories showed that teens’ cognitive subscale decreased by 55%, whereas 
their physiological subscale decreased by only 11%. The authors concluded that cognitive 
changes probably produced decreases in anxiety symptoms.  
 Other researchers sought to determine the potential mechanisms underlying the 
effectiveness of mindfulness-based interventions. For example, Roberts-Wolfe, Sacchet, 
Hatings, Roth, and Britton (2012) hypothesized that mindfulness’ effectiveness in 
decreasing symptoms can be attributed to its effects on emotional memory. They found 
that undergraduates who participated in a mindfulness meditation course remembered 
more positively-valenced words than did controls who attended a nonspecific course 
(e.g., a music course). Moreover, remembering positive words was positively associated 
with well-being and negatively associated with depression and anxiety. The authors 
suggest that mindfulness affects emotional information processing (by causing people to 
pay attention to more positive information), which in turn, affects clinical symptoms. 
 Researchers have argued that mindfulness works through increases in attention. 
For example, Roberts-Wolfe et al. (2012) highlight the association between mindfulness 
and attention. They explain that “meditation training is associated with better 
performance on a wide range of prefrontally mediated attention tasks” (p. 2). Therefore, 





This notion has been supported by intervention research showing that mindfulness 
training leads to improvements in attention in elementary schoolers (Napoli, Krech, & 
Holley, 2005). However, Hayes and Greco (2008) warn that there is a need for more 
research on the link between mindfulness training and improved attention in youth. 
Despite this, they propose that the automaticity displayed by anxious children is likely to 
be counteracted with mindfulness practices.  
 Altogether, the available research shows that mindfulness is negatively associated 
with anxiety, and that this is likely due to cognitive factors. Further support of the 
relevance of cognitive factors is displayed through adult research that has examined the 
specific components of mindfulness in relation to anxiety. Cash and Whittingham (2010) 
studied associations between the five facets of mindfulness (observe, describe, act with 
awareness, nonjudge, and nonreact) and anxiety in adults. They found that the nonjudge 
facet of mindfulness was negatively associated with anxiety. Cash and Whittingham 
(2010) describe nonjudge as the “ability to refrain from judging one’s own cognitions, 
emotions, and bodily sensations” (p. 180). This finding highlights the pertinent cognitive 
aspect of anxiety and it suggests that teaching individuals with anxiety to view their 
internal worlds in a nonjudgmental and accepting way can be highly beneficial. 
Although there is a need for more mindfulness research with youth, the current 
state of the literature shows that mindfulness is likely to be a protective factor for 
children and adolescents and that being mindful opposes being mind-full (Tan & Martin, 
2016). Therefore, mindfulness probably produces reductions in anxiety through cognitive 





and external stimuli) that allow them to slow down and nonjudgmentally absorb 
information. 
 Anxiety and cognitive fusion/defusion. Although there is some research 
examining associations between cognitive defusion and anxiety in youth, the majority of 
research includes adult samples. The available research on children and adolescents has 
shown that anxiety and cognitive fusion (the opposite of cognitive defusion) are 
positively correlated. For example, in the development of the Cognitive Fusion 
Questionnaire for adolescents, Sole et al. (2015) found that cognitive fusion was 
positively associated with anxiety sensitivity (fear of anxiety symptoms) in 308 Catalan 
adolescents. Similarly, Greco et al. (2008) found a positive association between cognitive 
fusion, anxiety, and somatic complaints using the AFQ-Y. These findings suggest that 
teens who have the capability to defuse from their thoughts tend to have lower anxiety 
symptoms than those who do not. 
 Although the state of the child literature on cognitive defusion and anxiety is 
lacking, there is a richer body of literature in adults. Most of the research on cognitive 
defusion in adults has examined it in relation to CBT and ACT. Hayes and Greco (2008) 
state that although it has been assumed that cognitive therapy works through direct 
cognitive change (by helping clients to change the content of their thoughts), some 
research suggests that it actually works through changes in the client’s relationship to his 
or her thoughts (which occurs with cognitive defusion). In support of this notion, Arch et 
al. (2012) studied longitudinal associations between anxiety sensitivity and cognitive 
defusion in 67 adult outpatients receiving either ACT (n = 32) or CBT (n = 35) (p. 469). 





major depressive disorder). Arch et al. (2012) compared associations between anxiety-
sensitivity (which is theoretically directly addressed in CBT through a change in the 
content of cognitions), cognitive defusion (which is an ACT strategy that aims to change 
the context of cognitions), and outcomes in the ACT and CBT groups. As expected, ACT 
showed a greater increase in cognitive defusion than did CBT. However, unexpectedly, 
cognitive defusion mediated the association between both treatment conditions and 
worry, quality of life, behavioral avoidance, and depression. Therefore, cognitive 
defusion explained the effectiveness of both ACT and CBT across various outcomes. 
Conversely, anxiety sensitivity was only a significant mediator when worry was the 
outcome. Notably, anxiety sensitivity is more theoretically relevant to worry than it is to 
other outcomes, such as depression. However, it is important to consider that an ACT 
strategy was a significant mediator across outcomes for both treatment modalities. 
Moreover, ACT actually led to greater decreases in anxiety sensitivity than did 
CBT (Arch et al., 2012). These results highlight the explanatory mechanisms accounting 
for treatment effectiveness and show that cognitive defusion accounts for a significant 
portion of the variance in improvement as a result of both CBT and ACT. This invites the 
question, “What about CBT provokes cognitive defusion in clients?” It is likely that 
simply the act of distancing oneself from cognitions during cognitive restructuring (a 
process-oriented technique) is leading to reductions in symptoms (Arch et al., 2012).  
 In a similar study focusing on anxiety and depression in 174 adult outpatients 
(about 47% of their sample had an anxiety disorder and about 35% had depression), 
Forman et al. (2012) examined the mediators of cognitive therapy (CT) and ACT. They 





shared across treatment modalities). Forman et al.’s (2012) results indicated that whereas 
cognitive and affective change strategies mediated outcomes in the CT group, acceptance 
strategies mediated outcomes in the ACT group. Moreover, they replicated Arch et al.’s 
(2012) results showing that cognitive defusion mediated outcomes for both treatment 
modalities. Cognitive defusion and behavioral activation each mediated the association 
between CT and outcomes and between ACT and outcomes. Therefore, both ACT and 
CT led to increases in cognitive defusion, which led to decreased symptoms. 
 Relatedly, Hayes-Skelton and Graham (2012) found that, in a cross-sectional 
dataset, decentering (which is similar to cognitive defusion) fully accounted for the 
association between cognitive reappraisal and social anxiety. They also found that 
decentering partially mediated the association between mindfulness and social anxiety. 
Hayes-Skelton and Graham (2012) suggest that although there are other explanatory 
mechanisms for the negative association between mindfulness and social anxiety, 
decentering appears to be the main reason that cognitive reappraisals work for those who 
are socially anxious. The authors suggest that “it may not necessarily be a shift in the 
cognitions that is important for reappraisal, but rather the mental process through which 
reappraisal occurs” (p. 326). 
Anxiety and experiential avoidance. Anxiety and avoidance have a cyclical 
relationship and several studies have shown that anxiety is both predictive of and 
correlated with avoidance in youth. For example, Venta et al. (2012) used the AFQ-Y to 
show that high levels of experiential avoidance predicted the presence of an anxiety 
disorder in 111 inpatient adolescents, even after controlling for depression. Relatedly, 





depression and anxiety (whom they referred to as mixed adolescents) and those who were 
only high on anxiety. They found that mixed adolescents generated more avoidance plans 
than controls and that anxious adolescents generated both avoidance goals and plans. 
They explained that from a neurobiological perspective, the behavioral inhibition system 
(BIS) (which is related to avoidance behaviors and is punishment-driven) and the 
behavioral activation system (BAS) (which is related to approach behaviors and is 
reward-driven) are opposing motivational systems (Gray, 1982, as cited in Dickson & 
MacLeod, 2004). Dickson and MacLeod (2004) state that their results support the notion 
that anxious individuals have an overactive BIS. They suggest that highly anxious 
adolescents have a goal system that is largely motivated by avoidance.  
Similarly, Dickson, Ciesla, and Reilly (2012) studied the temporal relationship 
among daily levels of anxiety and avoidance over the course of seven days. They found 
that adolescents who showed cognitive and behavioral avoidance displayed increases in 
anxiety. Therefore, consistent avoidance predicts increases in anxiety. Moreover, Simon 
and Verboon (2016) found that experiential avoidance was positively associated with 
various anxiety symptoms including symptoms of panic disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, social anxiety disorder, separation anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and specific phobia in a school sample of 
children aged 8 to 10. Altogether, these findings show that children and teens who are 
highly anxious premeditatedly produce goals and plans to avoid anxiety-provoking 
situations, and that their avoidance perpetuates their anxiety. 
 ACT and Latinxs. Although there are few studies specifically focusing on ACT 





mindfulness) are effective in treating Latinx youth. For example, one study showed that a 
12-week mindfulness intervention with Latin American middle school students led to 
significant decreases in externalizing and internalizing problems (Fung et al., 2016). 
Researchers have also shown that in this population, psychological inflexibility is 
consistently positively associated with depression, anxiety, and stress, and negatively 
associated with mindfulness and life satisfaction (e.g., Flynn, Berkout, & Bordieri, 2016).  
 Some researchers have argued that ACT strategies including mindfulness and 
acceptance are likely to be particularly beneficial to Latinx individuals because these 
strategies alleviate somatic distress and are likely to reduce attentional bias to threat 
(Hinton, Pich, Hofmann, & Otto, 2013). This is probably true considering that Latinx 
adolescents display higher rates of somatization than individuals from other cultural 
groups (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Varela et al., 2004).  
 It is likely that stressful experiences encountered by Latinxs influence 
mindfulness. Indeed, one study focusing on peer victimization during early adolescence 
with a relatively large Latinx subsample (34%) showed that peer victimization predicted 
decreases in mindfulness over the course of four months (Riggs & Brown, 2017). 
Therefore, negative peer experiences during early adolescence appear to influence 
dispositional mindfulness in Latinxs. This finding is particularly relevant to Latinx 
adolescents because others have shown that Latinx adolescent females are particularly 
vulnerable to experiencing reputational victimization (McLaughlin et al., 2007). Overall, 
it is apparent that in Latinx adolescents, ACT processes (particularly mindfulness) are 






Application of ACT Processes to the Information Processing of Anxious Youth 
In line with RFT, information-processing is related to the literality attributed to 
internal language processes. For example, if an anxious child sees another child laughing 
and interprets that event as “he is laughing at me,” this child can either brush the thought 
off as “just a thought” or attribute meaning to the thought and consequently view the 
stimulus as threatening. The maladaptive cognitive and behavioral responses displayed 
by adolescents with anxiety at each stage of the social information-processing model may 
be addressed by specific ACT processes. The next few sections will focus on the 
application of specific ACT processes, specifically mindfulness, acceptance, cognitive 
fusion/defusion, and experiential avoidance to various stages of the social I-P model, in 
particular encoding, interpretation, response access, and response selection. 
Mindfulness and encoding. Attention is relevant to the encoding stage of the 
social information-processing model because if attention is impaired during this phase, 
subsequent phases (interpretation, response access, selection, and enactment) are likely to 
be adversely affected. There is strong empirical support for the claim that anxious youth 
display deficits in attention (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997).  
Mindfulness is a process that can mitigate the negative effects that anxiety has on 
attention. Walsh, Balint, Smolira, Frederickson, and Madsen (2009) described 
mindfulness as “a state of enhanced attention to, and awareness, of, what is taking place 
in the present” (p. 94). Therefore, to be mindful is to be attentive, and when anxious 
children are presented with demanding and stressful situations, their attentional resources 
are not functioning properly (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). Anxious children are more likely 





environment (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). Because mindfulness promotes attentional 
control, it is likely that being mindful during the early stages of social information-
processing would disrupt the domino effect that overcrowded or “mind-full” attentional 
resources can have on subsequent behavioral plans and responses. 
Researchers have proposed that mindfulness works to reduce anxiety through 
increases in attentional control. For example, Semple, Reid, and Miller (2005) proposed 
“that the primary mechanism of mindfulness is self-management of attention” (p. 380). 
Walsh et al. (2009) confirmed this hypothesis in adults. They found that attentional 
control partially mediated the association between trait anxiety and mindfulness. 
Therefore, the negative association between anxiety and mindfulness is partially 
accounted for by control over attentional resources.  
Other researchers have shown that mindfulness decreases maladaptive automatic 
cognitive processes and increases data-driven processing, which would be beneficial 
during the encoding stage. For example, Wimmer, Bellingrath, and von Stockhausen 
(2016) showed that preteens in a Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction group displayed 
higher levels of cognitive inhibition (which they define as “the ability to suppress 
automatic responses if they interfere with current demands”) and greater data-driven 
information processing (as opposed to schema-based processing) post-treatment when 
compared to controls (p. 3). These findings suggest that mindfulness can improve early 
adolescents’ ability to objectively register environmental cues. 
Learning how to regain attentional control can be particularly beneficial to 
anxious youth, who are primed to detect threat (Beck & Clark, 1997). Because of their 





circumstances. It has been shown that anxiety in demanding situations is likely to 
negatively impact performance (Rothlin, Horvath, Birrer, & Holtforth, 2016). Notably, 
there is a lack of research focusing on associations between mindfulness and threat 
attention bias in anxious youth. However, mindfulness is likely to serve a protective 
function for the effects that anxiety can have on performance in demanding situations. 
For example, Rothlin et al. (2016) showed that in athletes, mindfulness buffers the effect 
of anxiety on performance-delivery. Therefore, individuals who are anxious can still 
perform well in demanding situations if they engage in mindfulness (Rothlin et al., 2016). 
Researchers have attributed these findings to the forgiving effects that mindfulness can 
have on working memory capacity during stressful periods (Rothlin et al., 2016). Because 
working memory can be overwhelmed by worries, learning how to ground oneself and be 
mindful can minimize distraction and prevent poor performance. These authors also 
found that anxiety mediated the association between trait-mindfulness and performance-
delivery. Trait-mindfulness was associated with lower levels of anxiety, which was in 
turn associated with better performance-delivery in demanding situations (Rothlin et al., 
2016). Although this research was conducted with adults, it suggests that attentional 
resources can be limited in demanding situations, but mindfulness attenuates the negative 
influence that stress has on performance. 
Mindfulness/acceptance and interpretation. It is likely that the open, 
nonjudgmental, objective, and attentive nature of mindfulness would oppose the threat 
perception bias present in anxious youth. To date, there is no research assessing the 
relationship between mindfulness and threat interpretation. However, there is research 





2016) and a positive association between anxiety and threat interpretation (e.g., Suarez-
Morales & Bell-Dolan, 2001). Because mindfulness contains several of the characteristics 
that anxious children lack (e.g., attentiveness and objectivity), it is likely that mindfulness 
accounts for at least some of the association between anxiety and threat interpretation. 
Moreover, mindfulness might serve a protective function for anxious children who are at 
risk for faulty interpretations. Therefore, in addition to serving as an explanatory 
mechanism for the association between anxiety and threat interpretation, mindfulness 
might also buffer the effects of anxiety on threat interpretation.  
Mindfulness and response access. Researchers have argued that “mindfulness 
enhances emotion regulation and cognitive performance” (Bellinger, DeCaro, & Ralston, 
2015, p. 123). Because the response access phase requires children and adolescents to 
come up with various solutions under stressful circumstances, it is likely that a boost in 
emotion regulation and cognitive performance would be helpful. Several studies have 
shown that mindfulness enhances cognitive performance under stressful circumstances. 
For example, Bellinger et al. (2015) found that mindfulness indirectly predicted math test 
performance via decreased levels of anxiety for problems that required greater cognitive 
resources. Because children who are on edge in the midst of a stressful situation may 
have clouded cognitive performance, mindfulness is likely to be beneficial for problem-
solving. In fact, Argus and Thompson (2008) found a positive association between 
mindful awareness and social problem-solving in depressed adults. These findings 
suggest that mindfulness is helpful during the problem-solving process and that it may 






It is likely that mindfulness improves problem-solving through increased 
cognitive flexibility. Greenberg, Reiner, and Meiran (2012) found an association between 
mindfulness and cognitive rigidity. They used an experimental design in which people 
who were and people who were not exposed to mindfulness training were asked to solve 
complex problems. However, each set of complex problems included “traps” (sets of 
problems that could be solved more simply). Greenberg et al. (2012) found that 
individuals with exposure to mindfulness displayed lower levels of cognitive rigidity (as 
evidenced by their ability to solve the simpler problems with simpler formulas instead of 
sticking with the same complex formula that was used for the complex problems). The 
authors explain this phenomenon by suggesting that mindfulness reduces the “tendency 
to overlook novel and adaptive ways of responding due to past experience” (p. 1). 
Therefore, mindfulness likely fosters the open-mindedness and creativity that is needed to 
develop inventive solutions to a problem. Like Crick and Dodge’s (1994) analogy of a 
marble rolling down a muddy and drying hill, Greenberg et al. (2012) refer to “the 
tendency to develop and perseverate in the use of mental or behavioral sets” as a result of 
the blinding effects of experience (p. 1). Mindfulness appears to contribute to the ability 
to consider alternatives. 
Mindfulness probably increases cognitive flexibility through its emphasis on the 
present. Ostafin and Kassman (2012) distinguish between insight and noninsight 
problems. According to these researchers, insight problems “are those in which the use of 
past experience leads to an impasse” whereas noninsight problems “are those which 
involve logic” and require the integration of past experience (p. 1032). They argue that 





because mindfulness prevents people from getting “hung up on ideas…or memories,” and 
increases an open orientation to the present moment (p. 1032). Ostafin and Kassman 
(2012) found that in undergraduates, mindfulness was positively correlated with the 
ability to solve insight problems. Moreover, mindfulness training predicted 
improvements in insight problem-solving. These findings apply to the response access 
stage of the social information-processing model because youth are frequently faced with 
novel problems to solve during this phase. Being mindful is likely to equip children and 
teens with the ability to have “Aha” moments and to develop several innovative solutions 
to a problem. 
Cognitive fusion/defusion and response selection. Unlike mindfulness, which is 
related to attention and creativity, cognitive fusion and defusion are probably more 
relevant to later stages of the I-P model. Researchers have argued that verbally-mediated 
strategies are not optimal for the early stages of the I-P model because of the nature of 
encoding and interpretation as automatic and unconscious (Beck & Clark, 1997). 
Therefore, whereas mindfulness seems to be more closely related to the early stages of 
the I-P model (including encoding, interpretation, and response access), cognitive 
defusion is likely related to the later stages (response selection and enactment).  
The limited research on cognitive defusion in anxious children and adolescents 
shows that youth who fuse with their thoughts experience higher levels of anxiety (e.g., 
Sole et al., 2015). It is noteworthy that the available research focuses on the opposite of 
cognitive defusion—cognitive fusion. Therefore, there is a shortage of research focusing 
on the efficacy of cognitive defusion in children and adolescents. Moreover, no studies 





many adolescents spontaneously use cognitive defusion when they are faced with a 
problem? This information would be useful to practitioners because it would determine 
how intuitive this skill is and whether it needs to be explicitly taught. In addition, no 
study has examined cognitive defusion through an open-ended questionnaire. The 
available research on cognitive defusion in youth uses Likert-type scales that assess 
cognitive fusion. Using an open-ended questionnaire would allow researchers to 
determine (a) the frequency of spontaneous use of cognitive defusion compared to 
cognitive fusion, (b) the types of cognitive defusion strategies that children spontaneously 
use the most, and (c) the specific contexts in which youth choose to use cognitive 
defusion strategies. It is apparent that there is a need for more research on cognitive 
defusion in youth. 
Experiential avoidance and response selection. Like cognitive defusion, 
experiential avoidance can be applied to the types of responses that children select. The 
decision to avoid anxiety-provoking situations has been extensively studied in 
adolescents. Researchers have established that anxious adolescents tend to avoid, and that 
their avoidance only perpetuates their anxiety (e.g., Dickson et al., 2012). They have also 
shown that anxious adolescents deliberately create anxious goals and plans (Dickson & 
MacLeod, 2004).  
Moreover, findings have specifically shown that anxious youth tend to choose 
avoidant responses during the selection phase of the social information-processing model. 
For example, Barrett et al. (1996) presented anxious, oppositional, and non-clinical 
children and early adolescents with ambiguous scenarios and asked them to interpret the 





then with their families to decide what they would do in each situation. Findings showed 
that when compared to controls, anxious and oppositional children were more likely to 
interpret the ambiguous prompts as threatening. Moreover, anxious and oppositional 
children differed in the plans they developed to address each situation. Relative to 
controls, anxious children created more avoidant plans and oppositional children 
produced more aggressive plans. Barrett et al. (1996) also found that when parents were 
involved in the selection-making, children’s selection to respond with avoidance 
strengthened. Therefore, parents served to exacerbate anxious children’s tendency to 
avoid what they perceived to be threatening situations. 
The negative effects of avoidance on long-term outcomes are clear. First, research 
has plainly shown that although avoidance may appear helpful in the short-term, it only 
perpetuates anxiety in the long-term. For example, avoidance has been shown to increase 
levels of anxiety over the course of 8 months (Whiteside, Gryczkowski, & Ale, 2013). 
Beyond this, avoidance predicts and explains a variety of other negative outcomes. 
Jacobson and Newman (2014) showed that anxiety in adolescence predicted increases in 
depression 12-14 years later, and that this association was partially mediated by levels of 
avoidance. Therefore, avoidance was a significant part of the explanation for the 
development of depression over the course of years. Avoidance has also been shown to 
be associated with increased levels of loneliness and social exclusion in youth (Gazelle & 
Rudolph, 2004; Johnson, LaVoie, Spenceri, & Mahoney-Wernli, 2001). 
Overall, the available research contributing to the understanding of avoidance 
during the selection phase of the information-processing model suggests the following: 





2012), (b) anxious children specifically develop avoidance plans during the selection 
phase (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004), and (c) avoidance leads to a variety of poor 
outcomes (e.g., Gazelle & Rudolph, 2004). These factors have led ACT therapists to 
identify avoidance as the antithesis to psychological flexibility. Altogether, ACT 
strategies attempt to counteract avoidance through openness, acceptance, nonjudgmental 
awareness, and committed action. Because avoidance can be maladaptive and intertwined 
with anxiety, strategies that help anxious youth to confront anxiety-provoking situations 
are likely to be beneficial. 
ACT processes, I-P, and Latinxs. Although there are growing bodies of 
literature focusing independently on ACT and on I-P with Latinxs, to date, there are no 
studies integrating the two with this population. Considering the available research 
showing that social interactions (e.g., peer victimization) are associated with ACT 
processes (e.g., mindfulness) in Latinx adolescents, it would be beneficial to add to this 
literature and examine associations between ACT variables and social cognitive 
processes (Riggs & Brown, 2017). As discussed, anxious children display deficits at 
various stages of the social I-P model (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997), and Latinx youth are at 
increased risk for the development of anxiety (Martinez et al., 2012). Therefore, an 
integration of the study of social I-P and ACT processes in Latinx youth (particularly 
adolescents) would be a valuable contribution to the literature and to clinical practice. 
Summary of the Literature and Purpose of the Study 
 The social I-P model clarifies associations between youths’ cognitions and 
behaviors (Dodge, 1986; Crick & Dodge, 1994). According to this theory, social I-P 





followed by a behavioral response (enactment). Social I-P is typically studied by 
presenting participants with vignettes and by having them interpret and develop 
responses to different types of situations (Crick & Dodge, 1994). When this procedure 
was used in samples of anxious youth, it was shown that children with anxiety display 
deficits at various stages of the social I-P model. Specifically, anxious youth tend to 
display threat perception and interpretation biases and to choose maladaptive solutions, 
probably due to impairments in attentional intensity (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997).  
 ACT is an empirically-supported therapy that emphasizes the role of context in 
both our private and public situational experiences. ACT processes including cognitive 
defusion, cognitive fusion, mindfulness, acceptance, and experiential avoidance have 
been studied in youth, albeit to a much smaller extent than in adult samples. Researchers 
have shown that certain ACT strategies such as mindfulness improve attention in youth 
(e.g., Napoli et al., 2005). It has also been established that children with anxiety display 
deficits in attention and that these deficits are tied to their tendency to use less 
information from their environments to make decisions (Beck & Clark, 1997). Therefore, 
it would be a worthwhile endeavor to determine whether specific ACT strategies are 
associated with particular stages of social I-P in anxious youth. A comprehensive 
examination of the association between ACT processes and social I-P theory would 
distinguish the therapeutic strategies that are effective during specific stages of 
adolescents’ social I-P. This type of study would also begin to clarify whether and how 
teaching specific strategies (e.g., mindfulness) would prevent deficits in the very early 
stages of I-P (i.e., encoding and interpretation), and in turn lead to choosing adaptive 





 Beyond these factors, research on ACT processes in anxious adolescents is scarce, 
especially research on culturally-diverse adolescents. Because Latinx youth are at a 
higher risk for the development of anxiety in comparison to other cultural groups 
(Martinez et al., 2012), there is a significant need for anxiety research that focuses on this 
population. Moreover, the available research with children and teens has been confined 
by the few ACT questionnaires that are available. It appears that the use of ACT 
questionnaires has been limited to closed-ended Likert-type scales. Therefore, it remains 
unclear how many children and adolescents spontaneously use these strategies when they 
are faced with a stressor and whether specific ACT strategies are more likely to be used 
at different stages of an encounter and in varying contexts.  
 Purpose of the study. The purpose of this study was to examine how specific 
ACT processes (mindfulness, acceptance, cognitive defusion, cognitive fusion, and 
experiential avoidance) relate to the social information-processing model and anxiety in 
Latinx early adolescents.  
Study Hypotheses 
Study hypotheses are depicted in Figure 1. The following relationships were 
proposed for the interpretation phase:  
A. Mindfulness and acceptance will be negatively associated with threat 
interpretation. The literature review did not yield any studies focusing on 
associations between mindfulness, acceptance, and threat interpretation. 
However, it is likely that the open, nonjudgmental, objective, and attentive 
nature of mindfulness and acceptance would oppose biased threat 





B. Mindfulness and acceptance will partially mediate the association between 
threat interpretation and anxiety. Although there is a lack of research 
specifically focusing on mindfulness and threat interpretation in anxious 
youth, studies have shown that mindfulness and acceptance are negatively 
associated with anxiety (e.g., Tan & Martin, 2016) and that anxiety is 
positively associated with threat interpretation (e.g., Suarez- Morales & Bell-
Dolan, 2001). Therefore, it is possible that mindfulness and acceptance serve 
as explanatory mechanisms for the association between threat interpretation 
and anxiety. 
C. Mindfulness and acceptance will moderate the association between threat 
interpretation and anxiety. Past researchers have shown that in adults, 
mindfulness attenuates the negative effects that anxiety has on performance in 
demanding situations (Rothlin et al., 2016). This is probably because 
mindfulness practices increase data-driven processing, which requires 
attentional resources (Wimmer et al., 2016). Because mindfulness contains 
many of the characteristics that anxious children lack (i.e., attentiveness and 
objectivity), it probably also serves as a protective factor for the association 
between threat interpretation and anxiety (Hayes & Greco, 2008; Roberts-
Wolfe et al., 2012). Additionally, a passive acceptance of emotions and of the 
situation is likely to buffer the detrimental effects of biased threat 
interpretation on anxiety through the ability to be nonjudgmental (Cash & 
Whittingham, 2010). 





D. Mindfulness will be positively associated with number of solutions. Although 
researchers have not specifically examined the association between 
mindfulness and number of solutions in youth, research does indicate that 
mindfulness boosts cognitive resources (e.g., Bellinger et al., 2015). The 
cognitive flexibility associated with mindfulness lends to better social 
problem-solving in adults (Argus & Thompson, 2008; Greenberg et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it was proposed that mindfulness would be associated with an 
increased number of solutions during the response access phase. 
Additionally, for the response selection phase, the following hypotheses will be 
examined:  
E. Avoidance will be positively associated with anxiety. Researchers have shown 
that anxious youth specifically choose avoidance strategies during the 
selection phase of the social I-P model (Barrett et al., 1996). Therefore, it was 
expected that this finding would be replicated in this study. 
F. Anxiety will be negatively associated with cognitive defusion and positively 
associated with cognitive fusion. It has been established that cognitive fusion 
is positively associated with anxiety (Greco et al., 2008), and because 
cognitive fusion opposes cognitive defusion (Gillanders et al., 2014), it was 
hypothesized that anxiety would be negatively associated with cognitive 
defusion.  
G. Mindfulness and acceptance will be negatively associated with avoidance. 
Researchers have explained that experiential avoidance “falls on the opposing 





mindfulness involves acceptance and has been shown to be negatively 
correlated with the AFQ-Y, which is a questionnaire that addresses avoidance 
strategies (Greco et al., 2008). Therefore, it was predicted that both 
mindfulness and acceptance would be inversely related to avoidance. 
H. Mindfulness and acceptance will be positively associated with cognitive 
defusion and negatively associated with cognitive fusion. Researchers have 
shown that mindfulness and acceptance are negatively associated with 
cognitive fusion (Greco et al., 2008). Therefore, it was proposed that these 
results would also emerge in this study. 
I. Mindfulness and acceptance will partially mediate the association between 
avoidance and anxiety. Several studies have supported the notion that anxiety 
and avoidance are positively related, possibly due to anxious individuals’ 
overactive behavioral inhibition system (Dickson and MacLeod, 2004). 
However, the explanatory mechanisms behind the association between anxiety 
and avoidance are still being clarified. Because it has been shown that anxiety 
is negatively associated with mindfulness and acceptance (Tan & Martin, 
2016) and because mindfulness and acceptance are likely to be negatively 
associated with avoidance (Bergomi et al., 2013), it was predicted that 
mindfulness and acceptance will account for at least some of the association 
between avoidance and anxiety.  
J. Mindfulness and acceptance will partially mediate the association between 
cognitive defusion/fusion and anxiety. In addition to the negative association 





shown to be negatively associated with cognitive fusion (Greco et al., 2008). 
Therefore, it was predicted that mindfulness and acceptance will mediate the 









A: Mindfulness and acceptance will be negatively related to threat interpretation.
 











Threat Interpretation Anxiety 
+ 
Total Effect Model 
Mediation Model 











C: Mindfulness and acceptance will moderate the association between threat 
interpretation and anxiety. 
Response Access Phase 




















Response Selection Phase 
E: Avoidance will be positively associated with anxiety. 
 
F: Cognitive Fusion will be positively associated with anxiety. 
 
G: Mindfulness and acceptance will be negatively associated with avoidance. 
 

















































J: Mindfulness and acceptance will partially mediate the association between cognitive 
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 Participants included 288 students in grades 6 through 8, drawn from a previous 
study on the role of cognitive and cultural factors in adolescents’ anxiety and depression. 
Students were enrolled in one of two public middle schools in South Florida. The sample 
was primarily Latinx (87%), female (64%), U.S.-born (60%), and low-income (44.8% of 
parents reported earning a yearly income that was less than $25,000 and 30.2% earned 
between $25,000 and $55,000). Of the 100 youth who were not U.S.-born, 86 identified 
as Cuban (30% of the total sample). Most of the participants (74.3%) resided in Spanish-
speaking homes and had parents who were not born in the U.S. (83% of fathers and 81% 
of mothers were foreign-born). The majority of foreign-born parents were born in Cuba 
(62% of fathers and 56% of mothers). Fifty-three percent of mothers and 45% of fathers 
reported having a vocational or college degree and most of the parents (71% of fathers 
and 56% of mothers) were working full-time. Families ranged from 2-10 members. See 












Table 1  
  
Sample Demographics Summary 
  
  
Variable Frequency (%) OR Mean (SD) 
  
  
Age 12.18 (1.03) 
Gender  
  Male 101 (35.1%) 
  Female 185 (64.2%) 
Race/Ethnicity  
  African American 3 (1%) 
  White 20 (6.9%) 
  Latinx 249 (86.5%) 
  Biracial 3 (1%) 
  Other 5 (1.7%) 
Child Nationality  
  American 171 (59.4%) 
  Cuban 86 (29.9%) 
  Other Latinx Countries 19 (6.6%) 
Father Nationality  
  American 17 (5.9%) 
  Cuban 177 (61.5%) 
  Other Latinx Countries 46 (17.01%) 
Mother Nationality  
  American 26 (9%) 
  Cuban 161 (55.9%) 
  Other Latinx Countries 62 (21.53%) 
Child Immigration Status  
  U.S. Born 173 (60.1%) 
  Immigrant 89 (30.9%) 
Language at Home  
  Spanish 185 (64.2%) 
  English 50 (17.4%) 
  Both 29 (10.1%) 
Number of Years in the U.S.  
  0-5 years 39 (13.54%) 
  6-10 years 41 (14.24%) 
  Over 10 years 9 (9.03%) 
Number of People at Home 4.18 (1.30) 
Mother’s Work Status  
  Full Time 161 (55.9%) 
  Part Time 38 (13.2%) 





Father’s Work Status  
  Full Time 205 (71.2%) 
  Part Time 18 (6.3%) 
  Unemployed 16 (5.6%) 
Mother’s Education Status  
  Elementary School 3 (1.04%) 
  Middle School 4 (1.39%) 
  High School 101 (35.07%) 
  Some College 44 (15.3%) 
  Associate’s Degree 23 (8%) 
  Bachelor’s Degree 52 (18.1%) 
  Vocational School 12 (4.2%) 
  Master’s Degree 16 (5.6%) 
  Doctorate Degree 6 (2.1%) 
Father’s Education Status  
  Elementary School 2 (0.69%) 
  Middle School 7 (2.43%) 
  High School 111 (38.54%) 
  Some College 46 (16%) 
  Associate’s Degree 10 (3.5%) 
  Bachelor’s Degree 39 (13.5%) 
  Vocational School 21 (7.3%) 
  Master’s Degree 10 (3.5%) 
  Doctorate Degree 2 (0.7%) 
Family Income  
  Below $10,000 50 (17.4%) 
  $10,000-24,999 79 (27.4%) 
  $25,000-39,999 45 (15.6%) 
  $40,000-54,999 42 (14.6%) 
  $55,000-69,999 18 (6.3%) 
  $70,000-84,999 12 (4.2%) 
  $85,000-99,999 6 (2.1%) 
  $100,000-114,999 6 (2.1%) 














Anxiety. Anxiety was assessed with the Revised Children’s Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (RCADS; Chorpita, Yim, Moffitt, Umemoto, & Francis, 2000; see 
Appendix A), which includes 47 items on a scale from 0 (never) to 3 (always) assessing 
anxiety and depressive symptoms. One item assessing suicidality was excluded for 
liability reasons. The RCADS produces total scores for anxiety, depression, specific 
anxiety disorders, and a total scale score. The total anxiety scale was used for this study. 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients in the original non-clinical standardization sample ranged 
from .71 to .85 (Chorpita et al., 2000). Moreover, convergent and discriminant validity 
have been established (Chorpita et al., 2000). RCADS subscales have been shown to 
positively correlate with relevant subscales on the Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety 
Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1985) and on the Children’s Depression 
Inventory (CDI; Kovacs, 1980), supporting convergent validity. Also, constructs that 
were expected to be less related than others (e.g., correlations between depression and 
anxiety in comparison to correlations between anxiety subscales) were weakly correlated, 
supporting discriminant validity. The RCADS has been validated with diverse samples of 
clinical and non-clinical children and adolescents including those from Caucasian, 
Japanese American, Filipino, Latin American, and Australian backgrounds (Chorpita et 
al., 2000; Chorpita, Moffitt, & Gray, 2005; de Ross, Gullone, & Chorpita, 2002). In this 
sample, the alpha coefficient for the total anxiety scale was excellent (α = .94).  
Mindfulness. The Children’s Acceptance and Mindfulness Measure (CAMM; 
Greco et al., 2011; see Appendix B) was administered to measure teens’ levels of 





moment awareness characterized by cognitions, emotions, and behaviors (e.g., At school, 
I walk from class to class without noticing what I’m doing). On the CAMM, scales range 
from 0 (never true) to 4 (always true) with lower scores representing higher levels of 
mindfulness. For this study, items were reverse-scored so that higher scores relayed 
higher levels of mindfulness. The initial standardization sample evidenced excellent 
internal consistency (α = .94) and demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity 
(Greco et al., 2011). Greco et al. (2011) found that the CAMM was positively associated 
with favorable outcomes including quality of life, academic competence, and social skills 
and that it was negatively correlated with unfavorable outcomes including somatic 
complaints, internalizing symptoms, and externalizing behavior. These associations 
remained significant after controlling for thought suppression (as measured by the White 
Bear Suppression Inventory; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) and psychological inflexibility 
(as measured by the AFQ-Y). Although the CAMM has not been validated in a Latinx 
sample, it has been validated in several other groups including samples consisting of 
individuals from Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and Catalan-speaking Spanish 
backgrounds (Bruin, Zijlstra, & Bogels, 2013; Cunha, Galhardo, & Pinto-Gouveia, 2013; 
Dion, Paquette, Daigneault, Godbout, & Hebert, 2017; Saggino et al., 2017; Vinas, Malo, 
Gonzalez, Navarro, & Casas, 2015). The Cronbach’s alpha in these data was α = .89, 
suggesting good internal consistency.  
Social cognitive processes, avoidance, acceptance, and cognitive 
fusion/defusion. Threat interpretation, number of solutions, avoidance, acceptance, 
cognitive fusion, and cognitive defusion were assessed with the Children’s Opinions of 





C). The COELE-R is an open-ended vignette-based questionnaire that has been used in 
the literature to capture youths’ social information processing during the interpretation, 
response access, and selection phases of Dodge’s (1986) I-P model. For this study, three 
vignettes were used from the original COELE-R to simplify and condense the 
questionnaire. Similar procedures have been used in prior research (e.g., Barrett et al., 
1996). Each of the three hypothetical situations represented a scenario that is likely to be 
present in children’s daily lives (e.g., One day, before starting the lesson, your teacher 
asks you to stay after class). Participants were asked to write what they thought happened 
in each situation. They were also asked to rate how threatening they viewed each 
situation (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely) and how likely they thought each situation was to 
happen to them (1 = not at all; 5 = very likely). Additionally, they were asked to list what 
they could think or do in each situation and how they would actually respond. In the past, 
interrater reliability coefficients for the COELE-R (with coding guided by Ayers’ (1996) 
conceptualization) have been acceptable (α = .71-.80; Suarez-Morales & Bell, 2006). 
To examine threat interpretation, the continuous variable highlighting the degree 
of threat perceived by youth was used. Further, to study number of solutions, the number 
of unique solutions listed was considered. This study will also use the COELE-R to 
measure avoidance, acceptance, cognitive fusion, and cognitive defusion. Although the 
COELE-R has been coded for behavioral and cognitive avoidance in the past (Suarez-
Morales & Bell, 2006), no study has used the COELE-R or any other open-ended 
measure to study acceptance and cognitive fusion/defusion in youth. Therefore, an 
adapted coding system was developed to analyze these variables in an open-ended format 





includes five categories: Experiential Avoidance (EA), Cognitive Fusion (CF), Cognitive 
Defusion (CD), Acceptance (A), and Other Coping Response (OCR). Each category was 
operationalized based on the available literature, and the manual includes examples of 
possible responses to the COELE-R that would fit each category. After responses were 
coded using ACT-consistent codes, a continuous proportion score was calculated for the 
question assessing response access, in which the frequency of each category was divided 
by the total number of responses. For example, if a child listed a total of four responses in 
response to the question, “If this happened to you, what could you do?” and three of those 
responses were EA responses, then his proportion score for EA would be 0.75. Therefore, 
the prevalence of a specific category relative to the total number of responses in the 
response access phase was used to test the relevant hypotheses. 
Procedure 
The archival dataset that was used in this study was derived from a research 
project that focused on how cognitive and cultural factors contribute to anxiety and 
depression in youth. The parent study was funded by Nova Southeastern University’s 
(NSU) President’s Research and Development Grant, which was awarded to Dr. Lourdes 
Suarez-Morales in 2013. NSU’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the Miami Dade 
Public School District IRB approved the parent study before data collection. IRB 
approval was received for the secondary data analysis involved in the current study. 
Recruitment and data collection. During recruitment and data collection, parent 
consent and child assent were required for participation. Trained research assistants 
(R.A.s) administered questionnaires in a group format (in the library or in the cafeteria of 





instructions aloud, answered questions, and informed participants that they can withdraw 
from the study at any time. Due to the large number of Latinx participants, items on 
questionnaires were presented in both English and Spanish. Participants were 
compensated with a $5 gift card to Target at the end of the study and they were also 
entered into a raffle to win a $50 gift card. 
Coding the COELE-R. To identify and code ACT processes including cognitive 
fusion/defusion, acceptance, and avoidance, a coding manual following the format of the 
original COELE-R manual was developed (see Appendix D). Two independent coders 
were trained to categorically code Questions 4 and 5 of the COELE-R (i.e., questions 
assessing response access and selection, see Appendix C for a copy of the COELE-R) 
using the five categories in the manual (EA, CF, CD, A, and OCR). Coders included two 
graduate R.A.s with limited knowledge about Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and 
who were blind to this researcher’s hypotheses. Training included nine meetings between 
this researcher and the R.A.s. During the first meeting, this researcher reviewed the 
manual with the R.A.s and administered 10 sample COELE-Rs drawn from the available 
data to practice coding. After practicing, R.A.s were assigned questionnaires to code 
independently. Twenty percent of the cases were assigned to both R.A.s to assess inter-
rater reliability. R.A.s were deemed ready to score after reaching percent agreement of at 
least .80 (after the first round of independent coding, percent agreement was 87.5). 
Disagreements were resolved in a group format. R.A.s were trained to code Question 5 
(which had one response to code) before they were trained to code Question 4 (which had 
several responses to code). Interrater reliability coefficients for both Questions 4 (κ = .78) 





After responses were coded and good interrater reliability was established, the 
data were ready to be analyzed. However, it was determined that there were too few 
Cognitive Defusion (CD) codes for this variable to be studied statistically. After 
reviewing responses to Question 1 (“What do you think happened in this situation? Write 
down the first thought that comes to your mind.”), several of the responses reflected 
cognitive defusion, especially for Situation 3 (One night, you wake up suddenly thinking 
that you heard a noise in the living room, but all is quiet) (e.g., some children wrote, “My 
mind was playing tricks on me”). Therefore, the R.A.s met for a tenth meeting, where 
they added CD codes derived from responses to Question 1. However, even after adding 
these responses as CD codes, the number of CD codes was still too low (number of 
individuals who had CD codes per situation ranged from 0 to 35 out of the 288 
participants). Because these codes were virtually absent, the cognitive defusion variable 
was removed from analyses (and cognitive fusion remained). 
 Percentage scores (derived from Question 4; each type of response was divided by 
the total number of responses) were used to assess associations between ACT variables 
and other continuous variables throughout tests of the main study hypotheses. In contrast 
to Question 4 (If this happened to you, what could you do? List all the things you can 
think or do in this situation), which provided a continuous percentage score, Question 5 
asked participants to pick only one solution (What would you actually do if you were in 
this situation?). Because data from Question 5 were categorical, they were more 
amenable to determining frequencies of ACT variables. Therefore, Question 5 was only 





gender differences in frequencies. See Table 2 for frequency counts (overall and within 
gender) of ACT codes for Question 5.  
Using Question 5 as a reference for frequency counts, for Situation 1, 29.5% of 
participants listed acceptance (A) as their one solution, 11.5% chose experiential 
avoidance (EA), 6.6% chose cognitive fusion (CF), and the rest picked another response 
(OCR). For Situation 2, 41.3% chose A, 11.8% chose CF, 2.8% picked EA, and the rest 
chose another response. For Situation 3, 26% chose A, 12.2% chose CF, 11.1% chose 
EA, and the rest chose another response. A series of 2 (gender) x 4 (ACT coping strategy) 
chi square tests were conducted to examine potential interactions between gender and 
ACT coping strategies in each situation. However, no chi square differences were 
























 Preliminary analyses were conducted to examine associations between all study 
variables and measures of central tendency for threat interpretation, number of solutions, 
anxiety, mindfulness, cognitive fusion, acceptance, and avoidance. Specifically, Pearson 
correlations as well as means and standard deviations for all study variables were 
computed. Bivariate correlations between the main study variables and demographic 
variables including age and income were also examined. Additionally, gender differences 
were tested with independent samples t-tests with the continuous percentage scores 
derived from Question 4 (therefore, significance tests assessed for significant mean 
differences in percentage scores between boys and girls for each ACT variable).  
 To test study hypotheses, a series of bivariate correlation, linear regression, 
moderation, and mediation analyses were conducted (see Figure 1 for a depiction of 
hypotheses). Data were analyzed with IBM SPSS v.25 and with PROCESS (Hayes, 
2017), which is a macro that tests mediation and moderation using bootstrapped 
confidence intervals. The setting used to test mediation and moderation analyses included 
5000 bootstrapped samples and a significance level of α = .05. PROCESS provides a total 
effect (the regression analysis between the independent and dependent variable), a direct 
effect (which is the path from the independent variable to the dependent variable, 
controlling for the mediator), and an indirect effect (which is the mediation effect). Total, 







Preliminary analyses including means, standard deviations, and independent 
samples t-tests (using Question 4 from the COELE-R) are included in Table 3. Bivariate 
correlations between all study variables are depicted in Tables 4-7. Table 4 depicts 












In the past, means on the COELE-R were derived from six situations, instead of 
the three situations that were used in the current study, therefore not allowing a 
comparison between the two samples. Suarez-Morales and Bell (2006) reported the 
following means and standard deviations for the threat interpretation rating of the 
COELE-R using six situations: Moverall sample = 15.13, SDoverall sample = 5.41; MLatinx subsample = 
15.94, SDLatinx subsample = 5.58. Previously reported means and standard deviations for 
mindfulness and anxiety slightly differed from the ones in the current study. Specifically, 
mindfulness scores were relatively higher in this study than in past research (CAMM 
mindfulness score: M = 22.73, SD = 7.33; Greco et al., 2011) and anxiety scores were 
somewhat lower than in past research (RCADS Total Anxiety: M = 33.02, SD = 19.06; 
Chorpita et al., 2005). Notably, the cited study for the RCADS (which included a mean 
for Total Anxiety for the whole sample) had a clinical sample. Therefore, it makes sense 
that the anxiety scores in this community sample were lower than anxiety scores in a 
clinical sample. 
Preliminary analyses also tested for gender differences in mindfulness, anxiety, 
number of solutions, threat interpretation, experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, and 
acceptance. See Table 3 for means and standard deviations of all study variables within 
gender. Significant gender differences emerged for mindfulness and anxiety. Specifically, 
girls evidenced higher anxiety scores than boys, t(284) = 3.57, p < .001. However, boys 
displayed higher levels of mindfulness than girls, t(244.67) = -3.60, p < .001. Across 
situations, girls and boys did not differ on number of solutions, threat interpretation 
ratings, avoidance, acceptance, or cognitive fusion. Similarly, when each situation was 





or number of solutions. Girls and boys also did not differ on levels of avoidance nor did 
they differ on acceptance per situation. However, in Situation 2 (school/teacher), girls 
had higher cognitive fusion scores than boys, t(257.34) = 1.99, p = .05. 
An assessment of bivariate correlations of variables calculated across situations 
(see Table 4) revealed significant positive associations between the following (bivariate 
correlations that were not targeted by hypotheses are listed here): threat interpretation and 
(a) number of solutions, (b) avoidance, and (c) cognitive fusion; between number of 
solutions and (a) avoidance, (b) cognitive fusion, and (c) anxiety; between cognitive 
fusion and anxiety; and between acceptance and age. Moreover, significant negative 
correlations emerged between number of solutions and acceptance and between 



































Main Analyses  
Analyses are described by hypothesis. Data were first analyzed across situations 
(scores for Situations 1, 2, and 3 were added before running analyses) and were then 
analyzed by situation (all analyses were rerun using scores from only Situation 1 and then 
the same procedure was used for Situations 2 and 3). Each scenario was treated 
separately to account for contextual differences that may lead to separate responses.  
Based on a functional contextualism framework and with the notion of “[acting] in 
context,” different contexts may pull for different reactions at varying levels of 
effectiveness (Hayes et al., 2012).  
 Hypothesis A: Mindfulness and acceptance will be negatively associated with 
threat interpretation. To test Hypothesis A, two bivariate correlations were conducted: 
one between mindfulness and threat interpretation and another between acceptance and 
threat interpretation.  
 Across situations. When scores were totaled across situations, Hypothesis A was 
fully supported. Both mindfulness and acceptance were negatively associated with threat 
interpretation bias (see Table 4).  
 Per situation. For Situation 1 (social relationships/peer), Hypothesis A was fully 
supported in that both mindfulness and acceptance were negatively correlated with threat 
interpretation (see Table 5). Similarly, for Situation 2 (school/teacher), Hypothesis A was 
also fully supported. Both mindfulness and acceptance were significantly negatively 
associated with threat interpretation bias (see Table 6). For Situation 3 (personal harm), 
Hypothesis A was partially supported. Although acceptance was negatively associated 





 Hypothesis B: Mindfulness and acceptance will partially mediate the 
association between threat interpretation and anxiety. For Hypothesis B, two 
mediation analyses were conducted. First, the total effect between threat interpretation 
and anxiety was examined. Although some researchers have argued that a significant 
total effect is required to test for mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), recent statistical 
methods including the use of bootstrapped confidence intervals to test for the significance 
of indirect effects allow for inferences about indirect effects even in the absence of a 
significant total effect (Hayes, 2009). Therefore, mediation/indirect effect results are 
reported even when the total effect was nonsignificant. A significant indirect effect for 
both mediation analyses would support the prediction that both mindfulness and 
acceptance mediate the association between threat interpretation and anxiety. 
 Across situations. Across situations, Hypothesis B was partially supported in that 
mindfulness mediated the association between threat interpretation and anxiety, but 
acceptance was not a significant mediator (see Figure 2). When mindfulness was the 
mediator, there was a significant total (β = .43, SE = .05, p < .001), direct (β = .29, SE 
= .04, p < .001), and indirect effect (β = .14, SE = .04, p < .001). However, when 
acceptance was the mediator, the indirect effect was nonsignificant (β = -.01, SE = .02, p 

























 Per situation. For Situation 1 (social relationships/peer) and Situation 2 
(school/teacher), mindfulness mediated the association between threat interpretation and 
anxiety (see Figure 3; Sit.1 total effect: β = .29, SE = .06, p < .001, direct effect: β = .16, 
SE = .04, p < .001, indirect effect: β = .13, SE = .04, p < .001; Sit. 2 total effect: β = .38, 
SE = .05, p < .001, direct effect: β = .23, SE = .04, p < .001, indirect effect: β = .15, SE 
= .04, p < .001). However, for Situation 3 (personal harm), mindfulness did not 
significantly mediate (indirect effect: β = .04, SE = .04, p = .32) the association between 
threat interpretation and anxiety. 
When examining acceptance per situation, acceptance did not mediate the 
association between threat interpretation and anxiety in any of the situations (see Figure 
4; Sit.1 indirect effect: β = .01, SE = .01, p = .64; Sit. 2 indirect effect: β = -.01, SE = .01, 

































 Hypothesis C: Mindfulness and acceptance will moderate the association 
between threat interpretation and anxiety. Hypothesis C is a follow-up to Hypothesis 
B. A significant interaction between (a) threat interpretation and mindfulness and 
between (b) threat interpretation and acceptance would support Hypothesis C. 
 Across situations. Across situations, Hypothesis C was partially supported. In line 
with hypotheses, mindfulness significantly buffered the association between threat 
interpretation and anxiety (threat interpretation X mindfulness interaction β = -.09, SE 
= .04, p = .03; see Figure 5 and Table 8). Therefore, as mindfulness increased, the 
association between threat interpretation and anxiety became significantly weaker (see 
Figure 6). However, contrary to hypotheses, acceptance actually exacerbated the 
association between threat interpretation and anxiety (threat interpretation X acceptance 
interaction β = .13, SE = .06, p = .03; see Table 8). Thus, as acceptance increased, the 























Table 8     
     
Across Situations: Mindfulness and Acceptance as Moderators of Threat Interpretation 
and Anxiety 
     
     
DV: ANXIETY β SE p 95% CI 
     
     
  Moderator: Mindfulness      
     
  Threat Interpretation .30 .04 <.001 .22, .38 
     
  Mindfulness -.63 .04 <.001 -.71, -.55 
     
  Threat Int. x Mindfulness -.09 .04 .03 -.17, -.01 
     
 
R2 = .58 
 
F(3, 282) = 127.55, p < .001 
 
     
  Moderator: Acceptance     
     
  Threat Interpretation .46 .06 <.001 .35, .57 
     
  Acceptance .04 .06 .45 -.07, .16 
      
  Threat Int. x Acceptance .13 .06 .02 .02, .24 
     
 
R2 = .20 
 
F(3, 282) = 23.32, p < .001 
 











 Per situation. Unlike the significant results that were found across situations, 
neither mindfulness (Sit. 1 threat interpretation X mindfulness interaction β = -.06, SE 
= .04, p = .13; Sit. 2 threat interpretation X mindfulness interaction β = .02, SE = .04, p 
= .71; Sit. 3 threat interpretation X mindfulness interaction β = -.06, SE = .04, p = .15) 
nor acceptance (Sit. 1 threat interpretation X acceptance interaction β = .12, SE = .07, p 
= .08; Sit. 2 threat interpretation X acceptance interaction β = -.01, SE = .06, p = .98; Sit. 
3 threat interpretation X acceptance interaction β = .09, SE = .07, p = .20) significantly 
moderated the association between threat interpretation and anxiety in Situation 1 (social 
relationships/peer), Situation 2 (school/teacher), and Situation 3 (personal harm). 
Therefore, mindfulness and acceptance did not change the association between threat 
interpretation and anxiety in any individual situation. 
 Hypothesis D: Mindfulness will be positively associated with number of 
solutions. To test Hypothesis D, a bivariate correlation was conducted. A significant 
positive correlation would support the prediction that children who are more mindful 
develop a greater number of possible solutions. 
 Across situations. Across situations, Hypothesis D was contradicted. Although 
mindfulness and number of solutions were significantly correlated, the association was 
negative instead of positive (see Table 4). Therefore, children who were more mindful 
listed fewer (not more) solutions. 
 Per situation. Consistent with the result found across situations, mindfulness was 
negatively associated with number of solutions for Situations 1 (social relationships/peer) 





3 (personal harm), mindfulness was not significantly associated with number of solutions 
(see Table 7). 
 Hypothesis E: Avoidance will be positively associated with anxiety. 
Hypotheses E-H were tested with bivariate correlations.  
 Across situations. Across situations, avoidance was not significantly associated 
with anxiety, although there was a positive trend (p = .055; see Table 4). 
 Per situation. Similarly, for Situation 1 (social relationships/peer) and Situation 2 
(school/teacher), avoidance was not correlated with anxiety (see Tables 5 and 6). Unlike 
Situations 1 and 2, there was a significant positive correlation between avoidance and 
anxiety for Situation 3 (personal harm), so Hypothesis E was supported for Situation 3 
(see Table 7). 
 Hypothesis F: Cognitive fusion will be positively associated with anxiety. A 
bivariate correlation was conducted to test Hypothesis F. 
 Across situations. In line with hypotheses, cognitive fusion was positively 
correlated with anxiety (see Table 4). 
 Per situation. Similarly, for Situations 1 (social relationships/peer) and 2 
(school/teacher), cognitive fusion was positively associated with anxiety (see Tables 5 
and 6). However, for Situation 3, cognitive fusion and anxiety were not significantly 
correlated (see Table 7). 
 Hypothesis G: Mindfulness and acceptance will be negatively associated with 
avoidance. Hypothesis G would be supported by negative correlations between (a) 





 Across situations. Across situations, acceptance (but, not mindfulness) was 
significantly negatively associated with avoidance (see Table 4). 
 Per situation. The results for Situations 1 (social relationships/peer), 2 
(school/teacher), and 3 (personal harm) resembled those found across situations. 
Acceptance (but, not mindfulness) was negatively associated with avoidance (see Tables 
5-7). 
 Hypothesis H: Mindfulness and acceptance will be negatively associated with 
cognitive fusion. Further, support for Hypothesis H would be demonstrated by negative 
correlations between (a) mindfulness and cognitive fusion and (b) acceptance and 
cognitive fusion. 
 Across situations. Hypothesis H was fully supported in that both mindfulness and 
acceptance were significantly negatively correlated with cognitive fusion (see Table 4). 
 Per situation. Similarly, for Situations 1 (social relationships/peer) and 2 
(school/teacher), both mindfulness and acceptance were negatively correlated with 
cognitive fusion (see Tables 5 and 6). Conversely, in Situation 3 (personal harm), 
acceptance was negatively associated with cognitive fusion, but mindfulness was not (see 
Table 7). 
 Hypothesis I: Mindfulness and acceptance will partially mediate the 
association between avoidance and anxiety. Hypothesis I was assessed with two 
mediation analyses (one with mindfulness as a mediator and another with acceptance as a 
mediator). Support for Hypothesis I would be demonstrated by significant indirect effects 





 Across situations. The total effect for Hypothesis I (between avoidance and 
anxiety) was nonsignificant (total effect: β = .12, SE = .06, p = .06; see Figure 7). Despite 
this, mindfulness and acceptance were tested as mediators. Neither mindfulness (indirect 
effect: β = .07, SE = .04, p = .12) nor acceptance (indirect effect: β = .02, SE = .01, p 











 Per situation. Consistent with what was found across situations, the total effect 
for Hypothesis I (between avoidance and anxiety) was nonsignificant (Sit. 1 total effect: β 
= .01, SE = .06, p = .89; Sit. 2 total effect: β = .07, SE = .06, p = .24) in Situations 1 
(social relationships/peer) and 2 (school/teacher). However, mindfulness and acceptance 
were still tested as mediators. Neither mindfulness (Sit. 1 indirect effect: β = .01, SE 
= .04, p = .76; Sit. 2 indirect effect: β = .07, SE = .05, p = .08) nor acceptance (Sit. 1 
indirect effect: β = .02, SE = .02, p = .19; Sit. 2 indirect effect: β = .01, SE = .01, p = .42) 
mediated the association between avoidance and anxiety. 
 Unlike Situations 1 and 2, there was a significant positive association between 
avoidance and anxiety for Situation 3 (personal harm). Both mindfulness and acceptance 
were tested as mediators. However, neither mindfulness (Sit. 3 indirect effect: β = .05, SE 
= .04, p = .27) nor acceptance (Sit. 3 indirect effect: β = .01, SE = .01, p = .33) 
significantly mediated the association between avoidance and anxiety. 
 Hypothesis J: Mindfulness and acceptance will partially mediate the 
association between cognitive fusion and anxiety. Similarly, to test Hypothesis J, two 
mediation analyses were conducted. Significant indirect effects for each mediation 
analysis (when mindfulness is the mediator and when acceptance is the mediator) would 
support this hypothesis. 
 Across situations. Mindfulness significantly mediated the association between 
cognitive fusion and anxiety (see Figure 8; total effect: β = .19, SE = .06, p < .01, direct 
effect: β = .10, SE = .04, p = .02, indirect effect: β = .09, SE = .04, p = .02). Contrary to 
hypotheses, acceptance did not mediate this association (indirect effect: β = .02, SE = .02, 





















 Per situation. Consistent with results across situations, for Situations 1 (social 
relationships/peer) and 2 (school/teacher), mindfulness was a significant mediator of the 
association between cognitive fusion and anxiety (see Figure 9; Sit. 1 total effect: β = .14, 
SE = .06, p = .02, Sit. 1 direct effect: β = .04, SE = .04, p = .31, Sit. 1 indirect effect: β 
= .10, SE = .04, p = .02; Sit. 2 total effect: β = .21, SE = .06, p < .001, Sit. 2 direct effect: 
β = .13, SE = .04, p < .01, Sit. 2 indirect effect: β = .08, SE = .04, p = .04), but acceptance 
was not a significant mediator of this association (see Figure 10; Sit. 1 indirect effect: β 
= .01, SE = .01, p = .36; Sit. 2 indirect effect: β = .01, SE = .02, p = .99). 
 Unlike Situations 1 and 2, there was not a significant total effect between 
cognitive fusion and anxiety for Situation 3 (personal harm) (Sit. 3 total effect: β = .05, 
SE = .06, p = .37). However, mindfulness and acceptance were nonetheless tested for 
indirect effects. Neither mindfulness (Sit. 3 indirect effect: β = .02, SE = .04, p = .55) nor 







































 The goal of this study was to examine associations between social information-
processing (I-P) variables (i.e., threat interpretation and number of solutions), ACT 
processes (i.e., cognitive fusion/defusion, mindfulness, acceptance, and experiential 
avoidance), and anxiety in Latinx early adolescents. The overarching hypothesis driving 
study predictions was that mindfulness/acceptance would explain and moderate 
associations between functioning at early (threat interpretation bias) and later stages 
(coping responses) of I-P and anxiety. Importantly, this study was likely the first to assess 
ACT variables with an open-ended questionnaire using vignettes with youth. The 
vignettes described different types of situations (social relationships/peer, school/teacher, 
and personal harm), which allowed assessment of hypotheses both across and by 
situation. Assessing situational differences is valuable in a study focusing on ACT due to 
ACT’s emphasis on contextual specificity. Using an open-ended questionnaire also 
allowed for the exploration of youths’ spontaneous production of ACT-related responses.   
Exploration of How ACT Variables Play a Role in Youths’ I-P 
 Several notable findings emerged after testing hypotheses. The following sections 
delineate study findings per ACT variable to highlight the roles that mindfulness, 
acceptance, avoidance, and cognitive fusion play during adolescents’ I-P. 
Mindfulness 
 Mindfulness, threat interpretation, and anxiety. As expected, mindfulness was 
shown to play a significant role in associations with threat interpretation and anxiety 





P model of anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997), agree that individuals with anxiety display 
threat perception and interpretation biases (see Waters & Craske, 2016, for a review). 
Research has supported these models by showing strong associations between threat 
perception, threat interpretation, and anxiety (e.g., Suarez-Morales & Bell-Dolan, 2001). 
The results from this study replicated previous findings by showing a significant positive 
association between threat interpretation and anxiety.  
 Additionally, mindfulness was negatively associated with threat interpretation, 
and mindfulness both mediated and moderated the association between threat 
interpretation and anxiety. To my knowledge, this was the first study to examine the 
association between threat interpretation and mindfulness in adolescents. The findings 
suggest that mindfulness both explains and buffers the positive association between threat 
interpretation and anxiety. Therefore, being mindful is likely to counteract the tendency 
of anxious individuals to automatically judge ambiguous situations as threatening. 
 The results from the current study suggest that the concept of mindfulness can be 
a protective factor for threat interpretation bias in social I-P and its association with 
anxiety in early adolescents. Moreover, past researchers have shown that mindfulness is 
negatively associated with anxiety (e.g., Tan & Martin, 2016), that anxiety is positively 
associated with threat interpretation (e.g., Suarez-Morales & Bell-Dolan, 2001), and that 
mindfulness is associated with improved attention (Napoli et al., 2005). Attentiveness and 
objectivity (two of the main characteristics of mindfulness) are likely to lead adolescents 
to slow down and gather more information from their environments before determining 
whether an ambiguous situation is threatening. Therefore, it was unsurprising that 





anxiety. The results suggest that across different types of situations, mindfulness plays a 
significant role during the early phases of social information-processing. 
Mindfulness and number of solutions. The literature shows that mindful 
individuals tend to be flexible and adept social problem-solvers (Argus & Thompson, 
2008; Greenberg et al., 2012). Therefore, it was originally hypothesized that mindfulness 
would be positively associated with number of solutions. However, when the data were 
analyzed across situations, the results showed that instead of being positively associated 
with number of solutions during the response access phase, mindfulness was negatively 
associated with number of solutions.  
 In retrospect and upon close examination of the data, the finding that mindfulness 
is negatively associated with number of solutions is not so surprising. Mindfulness can 
still be associated with increased problem-solving while leading to fewer, more selective 
and mindful solutions. That is, number of solutions does not equal quality of solutions. It 
may be that mindful individuals spend more time thinking through potential solutions and 
end up writing fewer solutions after problem-solving through the best options. In fact, an 
examination of the bivariate correlations shows that all adaptive coping strategies 
(mindfulness and acceptance) were negatively associated with number of solutions while 
maladaptive coping strategies (cognitive fusion and avoidance—and even threat 
interpretation and anxiety) were positively associated with number of solutions. 
Therefore, writing more solutions was associated with poorer quality of response-choices.  
 Past research specifically examining associations between number of solutions 
and anxiety has shown that anxious youth do not significantly differ from non-anxious 





2006), but that worriers tend to choose ineffective solutions (Suarez-Morales & Bell, 
2006). Therefore, it remains unclear whether the number of solutions variable 
representing the response-access phase of social I-P is characteristic or meaningful as a 
determinant of adjustment. A future direction would be to control for the quality of 
responses while analyzing the association between number of solutions and mindfulness.  
 Mindfulness’ role in social situations. The results revealed important differences 
by situation when each situation was studied independently. It appears that mindfulness 
only plays a significant role in adolescents’ I-P in social situations. Therefore, like the 
results found across situations, for Situations 1 (social relationships/peer) and 2 
(school/teacher), mindfulness continued to show a negative association with threat 
interpretation bias and cognitive fusion. Mindfulness also significantly explained the 
association between threat interpretation bias and anxiety. Additionally, it mediated the 
association between cognitive fusion and anxiety. Therefore, associations between I-P 
variables and anxiety as an adjustment outcome were repeatedly explained by 
mindfulness levels in the social situations. 
Several studies point to a distinctively strong relationship between mindfulness 
skills and social adjustment in adolescence. For example, researchers have shown that 
mindfulness interventions lead to improvements in social skills and relationships (e.g., 
Wisner & Starzec, 2015). These improvements in social outcomes are probably mostly 
due to mindfulness interventions’ effects on greater data-driven processing (Wimmer et 
al., 2016). The automaticity and “minimal analysis” that mindfulness combats is likely 
helpful in social situations, which are fast-paced (Beck & Clark, 1997, p. 50). In an effort 





Pratscher and colleagues(2017) coined the term interpersonal mindfulness, which they 
described as “mindfulness during interpersonal interactions” that “includes awareness of 
self and others, accompanied with the qualities of nonjudgmental and nonreactive 
presence” (p. 1206). They argue that although mindfulness is typically practiced alone, 
the goal is to bring it into everyday life. This is especially relevant to adolescents, who 
are typically engaged in social interactions. In their study with undergraduate students, 
interpersonal mindfulness was positively associated with friendship quality, even after 
controlling for trait mindfulness (Pratscher et al., 2017). Altogether, the available 
research and the findings from the current study point to mindfulness as an especially 
relevant and useful resource to adolescents for social adjustment.   
Acceptance 
 Like mindfulness, acceptance is an ACT variable that is characterized by an open 
embrace of internal and external experiences. Therefore, it was also expected to mediate 
and moderate the association between threat interpretation and anxiety. Interestingly, 
acceptance was generally not a significant mediator or moderator throughout tests of 
study hypotheses. However, acceptance significantly moderate the association between 
threat interpretation and anxiety across situations, albeit in the opposite direction than 
predicted (it exacerbated the association rather than buffered it). This was a puzzling 
finding. However, upon examination of bivariate associations, it appears that acceptance 
was negatively correlated with threat interpretation, but not significantly associated with 
anxiety. Because acceptance should theoretically be negatively associated with anxiety, it 
is possible that in this study, exhibiting high levels of both threat interpretation bias and 





individuals who interpreted situations as threatening, but who chose to accept those 
threatening situations were inherently more anxious because they chose a passive form of 
coping despite their high levels of threat detection and physiological arousal. Therefore, 
instead of truly accepting the situation and making peace with not having control over it, 
these individuals simply marinated in their cognitive threat-detection and nervousness. It 
will be worthwhile for future researchers to also (in addition to the open-ended 
questionnaire) administer a Likert-type scale that specifically assesses acceptance to 
determine how open-ended responses can be coded in a way that accounts for the various 
complexities of acceptance (e.g., its cognitive, physiological, emotional, and behavioral 
components). 
Additionally, it was predicted that mindfulness and acceptance would be 
negatively associated with avoidance. However, this hypothesis was partially supported 
(acceptance was negatively associated with avoidance, but mindfulness was not). This 
prediction was based on research that showed that mindfulness and psychological 
inflexibility, determined by high cognitive fusion and avoidance scores, were negatively 
correlated (Greco et al., 2008). Importantly, both of these measures are unidimensional, 
so it is difficult to tease apart specific associations (e.g., the CAMM does not produce 
independent mindfulness and acceptance subscales—it only provides an overall 
mindfulness scale). Because this may have been the only study to assess acceptance 
separately from mindfulness, the findings suggest that maybe the acceptance piece of 
mindfulness is what drives the negative association between mindfulness and avoidance. 
To further clarify this point, the available research on associations between mindfulness, 





unidimensional constructs (i.e., one measure, the AFQ-Y, produces a “psychological 
inflexibility” score rather than producing a fusion and an avoidance subscore, and another 
measure, the CAMM, produces an overall “mindfulness” score rather than producing 
mindfulness and acceptance subscores). Therefore, it is difficult to tease apart 
associations between specific variables such as avoidance and acceptance. These findings 
highlight the usefulness of multifaceted measures in disentangling these relationships. 
 Finally, the hypothesis that acceptance would mediate the association between 
avoidance and anxiety was not supported both across and per situation. This was 
surprising, considering past findings that have shown significant associations between 
mindfulness/acceptance, avoidance, and anxiety. However, it is notable that this was the 
first study to independently assess unique associations between acceptance (as opposed to 
a combination of mindfulness and acceptance) and these variables in Latinx youth. It is 
also noteworthy that there was not a significant correlation between avoidance and 
anxiety in most instances. It may be that the way avoidance was coded contributed to the 
lack of significant findings in this sample. 
Cognitive Fusion 
 In line with previous findings, it was hypothesized that cognitive fusion would be 
positively associated with anxiety (Greco et al., 2008). The fact that this hypothesis was 
supported in these data suggests that the coding of cognitive fusion was probably valid. 
Further, as expected, cognitive fusion was negatively associated with both mindfulness 
and acceptance. Cognitive fusion (becoming enmeshed with thoughts and taking them on 
as literal truths) inherently opposes mindfulness and acceptance, which involve open-





current study bolsters what has been previously found (Greco et al., 2008), and extends 
past findings via the measurement of cognitive fusion and acceptance with an open-ended 
questionnaire. Additionally, the findings suggest that previous findings with cognitive 
fusion replicate in a sample of Latinx early adolescents. This is important, as most of the 
available research on ACT processes in Latinx youth has focused on mindfulness. 
 Examining the results by situation revealed that associations with cognitive fusion 
differed between situations. It is unclear why cognitive fusion was associated with 
anxiety in Situations 1 and 2, but not in Situation 3. Perhaps responses such as “get my 
dad’s gun” (which were coded CF for Situation 3) reflected empowerment and 
confidence rather than enmeshment with or believability of thoughts (that there must 
have been a robber in the house). In contrast, for Situation 1 (social relationships/peer), a 
response such as “my friend doesn’t like me anymore” (which was coded CF) may have 
reflected a greater degree of vulnerability, and was therefore associated with more 
anxiety. Overall, the findings suggest that future researchers should continue to consider 
contextual differences in associations between anxiety and ACT variables.  
 It should also be determined whether other measures of adjustment (e.g., 
aggression) are associated with any of these responses, and whether these variables can 
explain the associations found in the current study. For example, responses such as “get 
my dad’s gun” or “get a bat” may have been listed by individuals who score higher on 
externalizing rather than internalizing problems. Each of these clarifications would lead 
to refinements in the understanding of how ACT variables relate to youths’ information-





 In an attempt to expand on the role of mindfulness to later stages of the social I-P 
model, mindfulness was also tested as a mediator of the association between cognitive 
fusion and anxiety. Past researchers have shown that cognitive fusion (measured with the 
AFQ-Y) is negatively associated with mindfulness (measured with the CAMM) and that 
both mindfulness and cognitive fusion are associated with anxiety (Greco et al., 2008). 
The results across situations show that mindfulness mediates the positive association 
between cognitive fusion and anxiety, but that acceptance does not. These results are 
informative as previous research with youth has not distinguished between mindfulness 
and acceptance in associations with cognitive fusion. The findings highlight that 
mindfulness continues to play a lasting role throughout the I-P sequence. Because the 
data in this study are cross-sectional, it will be important to determine whether 
mindfulness plays a predictive role by reducing children’s threat interpretation bias and, 
in turn, explaining their future solution-choices (e.g., responses that reflect cognitive 
fusion) and adjustment outcomes. 
Avoidance 
 Contrary to hypotheses, avoidance was not significantly associated with anxiety 
when the data were analyzed across situations. However, there was a strong positive 
trend (p = .055). The literature has established a consistent link between avoidance and 
anxiety (Barrett et al., 1996); therefore, the nonsignificant association in these data was 
surprising. It is important to note that when the situations were studied independently, 
only Situation 3 (personal harm) showed a significant association between avoidance and 
anxiety. Therefore, it appears that in this sample, the link between avoidance and anxiety 





context of being alone at home and hearing a noise that aroused anxiety; whereas 
avoidance in both social contexts was not associated with anxiety. It may be that trying to 
avoid or suppress negative emotions or the potential problem (e.g., by hiding under the 
covers or trying to ignore emotions) led to amplified anxiety in the solitary situation due 
to fewer distractors and greater opportunity to focus on anxious affect. 
 According to Hayes (2004), control is the main problem from an ACT 
perspective. He explains that “deliberately not thinking of something usually fails 
because the rule (“don’t think of x”) contains the avoided item” (p. 653). Therefore, it is 
likely that for Situation 3, adolescents pictured themselves repeatedly trying to suppress 
negative thoughts and emotions, and doing this was associated with higher anxiety.  
Examination of Frequency Counts of ACT Variables 
 The descriptive statistics derived from Question 5 on the COELE-R [What would 
you actually do if you were in this situation? (write only one)] showed some interesting 
variations by gender and situation. Although frequency counts were generally not 
significantly different (for Questions 4 or 5), it is still informative to review the 
descriptive statistics because no other study has used an open-ended measure to code 
ACT coping strategies in adolescents.  
 First, across situations, acceptance was the most frequently chosen coping 
strategy (this was particularly true for girls, who generally chose acceptance more often 
than boys). This suggests that adolescents typically choose adaptive coping strategies to 
deal with difficult situations. This is consistent with research showing that healthy 





coping strategies in the face of stress (Seiffgne-Krenke, Weidemann, Fentner, 
Aegenheister, & Poeblau, 2001).  
 In terms of maladaptive coping strategies, frequency counts of avoidance versus 
fusion differed by situation. For Situation 1 (social relationships/peer), avoidance was 
chosen more frequently than cognitive fusion (especially by girls). Therefore, in the 
situation where adolescents were asked to imagine that they did not receive an invitation 
to a party, most adolescents chose to avoid confrontation or their internal experiences 
instead of dwelling on their negative feelings and becoming enmeshed with their negative 
cognitions. This is consistent with research showing that relational victimization is 
positively associated with avoidance in adolescence (Storch, Brassard, & Masia-Warner, 
2003). It is likely that individuals who interpreted Situation 1 as a form of relational 
victimization (exclusion from a social event) tended to rely on (or use) avoidant 
responses.  
 Results differed for Situation 2 (school/teacher), where participants were more 
likely to choose fusion over avoidance. For this situation, adolescents were asked to 
imagine that their teacher told them to stay after class. The fact that more individuals 
chose fusion makes sense considering that there would have been consequences for 
avoiding the teacher. It is apparent that adolescents strategically chose solutions 
depending on the situation, which highlights the relevance of situation-specificity. 
 Why was defusion virtually absent from youth responses? Unlike the other 
ACT variables, which were present for each situation, cognitive defusion responses were 
rarely listed. Notably, these responses were most common for Situation 3 (personal 





thoughts so that they are viewed as just mental processes rather than overwhelming truths 
(Harris, 2009), is typically measured in youth via Likert-type scales (e.g., with the 
Avoidance and Fusion Questionnaire for Youth; AFQ-Y). There are a few obstacles to 
measuring cognitive defusion in this way. The AFQ-Y includes items that capture 
cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance and it produces an overall measure of 
psychological inflexibility. Therefore, it fails to tease apart cognitive fusion and 
avoidance. Most importantly, its items assess cognitive fusion rather than cognitive 
defusion. Although cognitive defusion is conceptualized as the opposite of cognitive 
fusion (Sole et al., 2015), it is unclear whether these two constructs lie on opposite ends 
of a continuum or whether they should actually be treated and measured independently. 
Because there is an absence of cognitive defusion measures in youth, the coding system 
developed for this study was based on the adult literature. This begs the question of how 
cognitive defusion actually manifests in children and adolescents. Although there are 
ACT intervention strategies tailored to adolescents (e.g., the DNA-V model; Hayes & 
Ciarrochi, 2015) that include cognitive defusion in them, there is an absence of research 
that specifically tests the effectiveness of these strategies. This is probably due to a lack 
of understanding of cognitive defusion and how it manifests or how it can be taught in 
different age groups. 
 The results from this study suggest that cognitive defusion is not a coping strategy 
that comes naturally to early adolescents. Because studies have not independently 
measured fusion and defusion in youth, it is uncertain whether youth in this specific age 
group are already consciously applying cognitive defusion strategies in their daily lives. 





applying these strategies and that cognitive defusion is a clinical strategy that can be 
helpful to youth, but needs to be explicitly taught.  
 Further, because there was no research exploring the frequency of spontaneous 
cognitive defusion responses prior to this study, it is unclear whether the way that 
cognitive defusion was coded affected the results. That is, although the coding manual 
resulted in good interrater reliability, it may be that the CD code was not valid. However, 
it is important to note that all other codes were expectedly present in adolescents’ 
responses and that each of the codes in the coding manual was carefully constructed as a 
result of an extensive review of the ACT literature. 
 Beyond this, it is important to recognize that the majority of CD codes were found 
for Situation 3 (after open-ended responses from the interpretation phase were added as 
coping strategies to Question 4), which was a non-social, solitary situation (personal 
harm). For example, responses such as “I think that I made up the sound in my mind,” 
and “My imagination made me hear something,” were coded CD. Why were these 
responses only present for Situation 3 (personal harm)? It is probable that whereas 
solitary situations call for more reflective processing, the fast pace of social situations 
pulls for more automatic processing (so, adolescents rely on fewer cognitive or “verbally-
mediated” strategies during social situations; Beck & Clark, 1997, p. 50).  
 It is also important to note that the number of CD codes substantially grew after 
adding participants’ responses from a question targeting the interpretation phase of social 
I-P (What do you think happened in this situation? Write down the first thought that 
comes to your mind). Therefore, it may be that CD is a process that more frequently 





phases. Altogether, these factors shed a novel light on a construct that has received very 
little attention in the child and adolescent literature. 
Implications for the Measurement of ACT Processes 
 The use of an open-ended measure that thoroughly assesses various ACT 
strategies was an important contribution to the youth ACT literature. Although 
intervention research on ACT and other mindfulness-based therapies is in a state of active 
growth, the measurement literature appears to be at a relative standstill.  
 Remarkably, mindfulness has the largest research-base and attention of all the 
ACT strategies, and even mindfulness is currently suffering from a shortage of valid and 
reliable measures in youth (Goodman, Madni, & Semple, 2017). Although there has been 
growth in the development of trait-mindfulness measures (see Pallozzi, Wertheim, 
Paxton, & Ong, 2016 for a review) for children and adolescents, all of these measures 
appear to be closed-ended measures with Likert-type scales assessing a unidimensional 
construct of mindfulness (this includes the CAMM, which was the measure employed in 
the current study).  
 Several researchers have argued that studying mindfulness as a multi-faceted 
construct (as it has been studied in adults) would also be beneficial for youth because it 
would distinguish which specific characteristics of mindfulness relate to certain outcomes 
(Goodman et al., 2017; Pallozzi et al., 2016). Developing multifactorial measures of 
mindfulness would also clarify which facets of mindfulness serve as mechanisms of 
change for specific mindfulness-based interventions (Goodman et al., 2017). Goodman et 





children’s cognitive capacities are continuously changing, so it follows that certain 
aspects of mindfulness would be more accessible at different developmental periods. 
 Beyond the shortage of mindfulness measurement studies in youth, there are very 
few measures that specifically target cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance. Similar 
to mindfulness questionnaires, the few available measures (e.g., the Avoidance and 
Fusion Questionnaire for Youth and the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire; Greco et al., 
2008; Sole et al., 2015), are closed-ended Likert-types scales with single factors (e.g., 
psychological inflexibility or cognitive fusion). Further, it appears that no available 
measures explicitly assess cognitive defusion. The results from the current study suggest 
that it would be worthwhile to distinguish between the measurement of cognitive fusion 
and cognitive defusion. Altogether, it is evident that further research on the measurement 
of ACT processes in youth is warranted. 
Implications for Clinical Practice and Future Intervention Research 
 Although there is a growing literature on ACT for children and adolescents, there 
are several limitations to the available literature that invite future research opportunities. 
In a thorough review of the literature on mindfulness interventions for adolescents, Tan 
(2016) found that there is about one published RCT of a clinical mindfulness 
intervention, and that the majority of the available research consists of longitudinal 
feasibility studies. Moreover, most of these studies did not include pre-, mid-, or post-
treatment measures of mindfulness (they assessed changes in youths’ symptoms such as 
anxiety). Although testing for changes in symptoms is important, the goal of a 
mindfulness intervention is to increase mindfulness, so it is surprising that intervention 





intervention research testing for changes in mindfulness can be explained by the shortage 
of measurement research. Therefore, as researchers develop and refine mindfulness 
measures for youth, more intervention research will include these measures. Tan (2016) 
also notes that at the time of publication, there were no comparison studies with 
adolescents. Therefore the goals for future research on mindfulness interventions for 
youth should be to test for the efficacy and effectiveness of these interventions via RCTs, 
comparison studies, and changes in mindfulness. 
 Further, most of the available mindfulness interventions originated from adult 
programs. Developmental considerations are important as the cognitive capabilities of 
adolescents differ from those of adults (Tan, 2016). Although Tan’s (2016) review 
focused on mindfulness interventions, this information is even more relevant to other 
ACT practices such as cognitive defusion. Because the literature focusing on specific 
ACT strategies in youth is nascent, it is unclear which ACT strategies are most 
appropriate for children and adolescents. Although the results from this study do not 
speak to this directly, they do suggest that early adolescents do not intuitively use 
cognitive defusion as a coping strategy to the same degree that they might use 
mindfulness, acceptance, and other forms of coping. 
 The findings from this study also clarify the situations in which mindfulness is 
most likely to be helpful to early adolescents. Specifically, mindfulness was most 
relevant to associations between youths’ I-P and anxiety in social situations. This 
suggests that teaching children and early adolescents mindfulness skills as a prevention 
strategy would assist in disrupting the domino effect that overcrowded or “mind-full” 





in social interactions. Future mindfulness intervention researchers should strongly 
consider including measures of social adjustment when studying early adolescents and 
clinicians should consider implementing mindfulness strategies with adolescents who 
struggle socially. 
 Finally, the potential for cultural adaptations will be important to consider in 
further developments of ACT interventions for youth. Culturally-sensitive third-wave 
intervention research is currently in its embryonic phase with only a handful of studies 
examining these interventions in Latinxs (e.g., Fung et al., 2016; Hinton et al., 2013). 
Determining whether and how to tailor interventions to Latinx youth is crucial, 
considering their higher risk for anxiety (Martinez et al., 2012). The results from this 
study and from the available literature suggest that using ACT strategies, particularly 
mindfulness to cope with social difficulties, can be especially beneficial to Latinx early 
adolescents. It will be a worthy endeavor to examine associations between culturally-
sensitive variables (e.g., familismo, somatization, and acculturative stress) and 
intervention outcomes in this particular group. For example, there is a growing research-
base on the effects of maternal mindfulness on youth outcomes (e.g., Siu et al., 2016). 
Incorporating this research into intervention research with Latinx youth would be 
relevant due to the cultural emphasis on the family in this population (Varela et al., 
2004). 
 Altogether, the growth of ACT research in children and adolescents appears 
promising, but there remains a lot of opportunity for refinement. Specifically, researchers 
should shift their focus from feasibility or preliminary studies to RCTs with comparisons 





developmental and cultural considerations while delineating these intervention programs. 
Finally, it appears that contextual differences make a statement in early adolescence by 
speaking to mindfulness’ relevance to social relationships. This calls for a need for more 
mindfulness intervention research that focuses on adolescents’ social adjustment. The 
findings also suggest to clinicians working with early adolescents that mindfulness skills 
can be taught as a prevention strategy to address ineffective social information-
processing. Targeting the very early phases of social information-processing (i.e., the 
encoding and interpretation phases) by teaching mindfulness skills to youth is likely to 
decrease ineffective solution-choices and lead to improvements in social interactions. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Despite the clear strengths of this study including the large, culturally-diverse 
sample, the inclusion of novel measurement strategies, and the broad assessment of 
various associations between I-P theory and ACT, there were several limitations that 
should be addressed in future research. First, and most importantly, the cross-sectional 
nature of the data limit inferences of predictability. However, it is important to note that it 
can be difficult to study longitudinal relationships in youths’ I-P using vignettes. 
Although social I-P typically uses terminology such as “phases” and “stages,” these 
phases are not necessarily sequential (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Therefore, moment-to-
moment real-life interactions and the use of experimental designs can be used to infer 
causal relationships between I-P and ACT variables in future research.  
 Moreover, this study appears to have been the first to measure several ACT 
variables via an open-ended questionnaire in youth. The fact that the coding manual 





correlations were significant in the expected direction brings credence to this particular 
measure. However, future researchers should attempt to replicate these findings to 
substantiate the reliability and validity of the measure used in the current study. This is 
particularly true because cognitive defusion was not coded enough times to include this 
variable in analyses. These results suggest that this variable deserves more research 
attention in this particular population. 
 Another limitation of this study is that it did not compare between cultural groups 
and this should be an important future direction for research. However, it is notable that 
this study is one of a handful of research that focus on ACT processes in Latinx youth. 
There is also a shortage of ACT methodological research that is culturally sensitive. 
Researchers have argued that third-wave processes, such as mindfulness, likely manifest 
themselves differently across cultures; therefore, developing culturally-sensitive 
measures is imperative. For example, Goodman et al. (2017) explain that “many current 
practices and assessments of mindfulness… are not conceptualized within a 
biopsychosocial model or framed within a religious, spiritual, or cultural context” (p. 
1411). For Latinx youth, it may be that greater somatization somehow influences these 
internal processes (McLaughlin et al., 2007). Comparison studies would be an important 
addition to the literature, because they would reveal significant differences in the 
manifestation of these processes. For example, a comparison study might show that in 
comparison to other cultural groups, Latinx youth generally display lower levels of 
mindfulness due to a greater tendency to somaticize their emotions. 
 Finally, it is important to note that all the available ACT measures for youth 





Using self-report measures can be advantageous, especially in older youth such as 
adolescents, because some research has pointed to discrepancies in parent- and child-
reports of internal phenomena (e.g., Briggs-Gowan, Carter, & Schwab-Stone, 1996). 
However, for very young children, self-report measures are limiting, and adults are 
typically responsible for rating their symptoms and behaviors. Beyond this, researchers 
have argued that even research on adolescents and older children would benefit from 
others’ reports on ACT processes such as mindfulness. For example, Goodman et al. 
(2017) argue that only using self-report to assess mindfulness can be problematic because 
individuals who are less mindful likely have less insight into their internal processes, and 
are thus less likely to report accurately on their mindfulness levels.  
 Notably, recent adult research shows that close others can accurately report on 
one’s behavioral aspects of mindfulness. Specifically, May and Reinhardt (2018) 
assessed self-other agreement using the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire in 129 
undergraduates and close others. They found that there was a high level of agreement 
between self- and other-reports of mindfulness, suggesting that close others can 
accurately report on mindfulness. These findings are promising to the child 
methodological literature and suggest that parents and teachers should be able to rate 
young children’s mindfulness levels. 
 Additionally, the current study solely focused on anxiety as a correlate of ACT 
and I-P variables. Originally, I-P theory was based on aggressive cognitive and 
behavioral responses in youth (Dodge, 1986), and ACT intervention studies have shown 
improvements in aggressive behavior (Twohig, Hayes, & Berlin, 2008). It follows that 





cognitive and behavioral responses to different situations. Future researchers should 
determine whether the results from the current study generalize to adolescents with 
externalizing problems. 
Conclusion 
 Altogether, the current study addressed several unanswered questions, but it 
focused on a very specific population. Additional ACT and I-P research with samples 
consisting of youth from various age-groups and cultural backgrounds would assist in an 
evaluation of age and cross-cultural differences. Further, the results from the current 
study and the state of the literature suggest that there is vast opportunity for the expansion 
of ACT research in youth. More research on the plausibility of assessing ACT variables 
with open-ended measures would be worthwhile, especially to determine the spontaneous 
use of ACT processes in different cultures and age-groups. Other research areas that 
deserve our attention include the development of cognitive defusion measures in youth, a 
focus on culturally-sensitive measurement, and an exploration into parent- and teacher-
reports of ACT processes in youth. The goal of any research study is to venture through 
unopened doors in an effort to explore even more doors that are yet to be opened. The 
results from the current study shed a significant light on clinical strategies that are likely 
to be beneficial at specific stages of youths’ information-processing. 
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Please put a circle around the word that shows how often each of these things happen to 
you. There are no right or wrong answers.  
 
1. I worry about things   Never  Sometimes Often Always 
2. I feel sad or empty  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
3. When I have a problem, I get a funny feeling 
in my stomach  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
4. I worry when I think I have done poorly at 
something  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
5. I would feel afraid of being on my own at 
home  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
6. Nothing is much fun anymore  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
7. I feel scared when I have to take a test  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
8. I feel worried when I think someone is angry 
with me    
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
9. I worry about being away from my parents  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
10. I get bothered by bad or silly thoughts or 
pictures in my mind  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
11. I have trouble sleeping  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
12. I worry that I will do badly at my school 
work  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
13. I worry that something awful will happen to 
someone in my family  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
14. I suddenly feel as if I can't breathe when 
there is no reason for this  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
15. I have problems with my appetite  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
16. I have to keep checking that I have done 
things right (like the switch is off, or the door is 
locked)  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
17. I feel scared if I have to sleep on my own  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
18. I have trouble going to school in the 
mornings because I feel nervous or afraid  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
19. I have no energy for things  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
20. I worry I might look foolish  Never  Sometimes Often Always 





22. I worry that bad things will happen to me  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
23. I can't seem to get bad or silly thoughts out 
of my head  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
24. When I have a problem, my heart beats 
really fast  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
25. I cannot think clearly  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
26. I suddenly start to tremble or shake when 
there is no reason for this  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
27. I worry that something bad will happen to 
me  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
28. When I have a problem, I feel shaky  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
29. I feel worthless  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
30. I worry about making mistakes  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
31. I have to think of special thoughts (like 
numbers or words) to stop bad things from 
happening  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
32. I worry what other people think of me  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
33. I am afraid of being in crowded places (like 
shopping centers, the movies, buses, busy 
playgrounds)  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
34. All of a sudden I feel really scared for no 
reason at all  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
35. I worry about what is going to happen  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
36. I suddenly become dizzy or faint when there 
is no reason for this  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
37. I feel afraid if I have to talk in front of my 
class  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
38. My heart suddenly starts to beat too quickly 
for no reason 
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
39. I feel like I don’t want to move  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
40. I worry that I will suddenly get a scared 
feeling when there is nothing to be afraid of  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
41. I have to do some things over and over 
again (like washing my hands, cleaning or 
putting things in a certain order)  
 
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
42. I feel afraid that I will make a fool of myself 
in front of people  





43. I have to do some things in just the right 
way to stop bad things from happening  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
44. I worry when I go to bed at night  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
45. I would feel scared if I had to stay away 
from home overnight  
Never  Sometimes Often Always 
46. I feel restless  Never  Sometimes Often Always 
 
Note. In this sample, the alpha coefficient for the total anxiety scale was excellent  

















































We want to know more about what you think, how you feel, and what you do. Read each sentence. 













1. I get upset with myself for having feelings that don’t make sense. 0 1 2 3 4 
2. At school, I walk from class to class without noticing what I’m 
doing. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. I keep myself busy so I don’t notice my thoughts or feelings. 0 1 2 3 4 
4. I tell myself that I shouldn’t feel the way I’m feeling. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I push away thoughts that I don’t like. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. It’s hard for me to pay attention to only one thing at a time. 0 1 2 3 4 
7. I think about things that happened in the past instead of thinking 
about things that are happening right now. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts. 0 1 2 3 4 
9. I think that some of my feelings are bad and that I shouldn’t have 
them. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I stop myself from having feelings that I don’t like. 0 1 2 3 4 
 










































1)  One of your close friends tells you that another one of your friends is having a birthday party 
next Saturday.  He received an invitation in the mail and you have not received an invitation. 
   






2.  How scary/threatening is this situation for you? (circle one) 
 1  2  3  4  5 
     not at all        mild  moderate severe  extremely 
 
3.  How likely do you think this is to happen to you? (circle one) 
 1  2  3  4  5 
     not at all   somewhat likely      very likely 
 
4.  If this happened to you, what could you do? List all the things you can think or do in this 














2)  One day before starting the lesson, your teacher asks you to stay after class. 






2.  How scary/threatening is this situation for you? (circle one) 
 1  2  3  4  5 
     not at all        mild  moderate severe  extremely 
 
3.  How likely do you think this is to happen to you? (circle one) 
 1  2  3  4  5 






4.  If this happened to you, what could you do? List all the things you can think or do in this 














3)  One night, you wake up suddenly thinking that you heard a noise in the living room, but all is 
quiet. 
 






2.  How scary/threatening is this situation for you? (circle one) 
 1  2  3  4  5 
     not at all        mild  moderate severe  extremely 
 
3.  How likely do you think this is to happen to you? (circle one) 
 1  2  3  4  5 
     not at all   somewhat likely      very likely 
 
4.  If this happened to you, what could you do? List all the things you can think or do in this 












































































Each solution will be rated according to the following five categories: 
1) Experiential Avoidance (EA) 
2) Cognitive Fusion (CF) 
3) Cognitive Defusion (CD) 
4) Acceptance (A) 
5) Other Coping Response (OCR) 
 
1) Experiential Avoidance (EA): includes attempts to suppress, avoid, or escape unwanted 
thoughts, feelings, or situations (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). 
 
o Includes: 
▪ Attempts to not think about the situation 
• Examples: “try to think about something else;” “ignore it;” “try 
to forget about it” 
▪ Attempts to avoid negative emotions 
• Examples: “try not to worry about it;” “try to be happy” 
▪ Behavioral attempts to avoid a situation instead of confronting the 
problem 
• Examples: “stop talking to the friend who didn’t invite me;” “get 
under my bed;” “I would make an excuse to leave” 
 
o Does NOT include: 
Going with the flow; not doing anything about the problem (e.g., “go on like nothing 
happened;” “stay after class;” “stay in my room;” see Acceptance) 
 
2) Cognitive Fusion (CF): describes responses in which the person becomes entangled in 
and overwhelmed by his/her thoughts to the point that thoughts are likely to interfere with 
effective behavior (Gillanders et al., 2014; Greco et al., 2008). 
 
o Includes: 
▪ Believing thoughts 
• Examples: “my friend doesn’t like me anymore;” “I’m in 
trouble” 
▪ Reacting behaviorally and/or emotionally to thoughts 
• Examples: “I would freak out and get a bat to see if anything is 
there;” “get my dad’s gun” (in response to the thought that there 
is a robber in the house) 
▪ Over-analyzing situations 
• Examples: “I would spend hours thinking about what to do;” 
“pick apart the situation;” “I would hope I didn’t do anything 
wrong” 
▪ Evaluating and judging thought-content 
• Examples: “I would tell myself that it is wrong to think that 
way” 
 
o Does NOT include: 
Avoidance behaviors in response to fused thoughts (see Experiential Avoidance); 
recognizing thoughts as just thoughts (e.g., “I would tell myself it’s all in my head;” 






3) Cognitive Defusion (CD): includes responses in which people try to distance themselves 
from their thoughts (Gillanders et al., 2014). Thoughts, images, and memories are 
observed and are recognized as mental events rather than overwhelming truths, and this 
leads to effective action (Harris, 2009). 
 
o Includes: 
▪ Observation of thoughts 
▪ Example: “Notice my thoughts” 
▪ Recognition of thoughts as ‘just thoughts’ 
▪ Examples: “Tell myself it’s just a thought;” “Tell myself it’s all 
in my head” 
▪ Acceptance of thoughts 
▪ Example: “Tell myself it’s okay to think this way” 
 
o Does NOT include: 
Attempts to alter the form of thoughts (i.e., cognitive restructuring; positive 
thinking); attempts to alter the frequency of thoughts (Hayes et al., 2006); acceptance 
of emotions and of the situation (see Acceptance) 
 
4) Acceptance (A): involves the active and aware embrace of unpleasant material without 
trying to alter or avoid it (Coyne et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2006). 
 
o Includes: 
o Acceptance of emotions 
▪ Examples: “Tell myself it’s okay to feel this way;” “It’s okay to 
feel afraid” 
o Acceptance of the situation 
▪ Examples: “Go on like nothing happened;” “Stay after class;” 
“Stay in my room” 
 
o Does NOT include: 
Acceptance of thoughts (see Cognitive Defusion); avoidant responses (e.g., “ignore 
it;” see Experiential Avoidance) 
 
5) Other Coping Response (OCR): any response that does not fit one of the above categories 
 
